Marquette University Law School

Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1-1-2006

Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as
Informational Regulation
Chad M. Oldfather
Marquette University Law School, chad.oldfather@marquette.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Chad M. Oldfather, Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 Fla. L.
Rev. 743 (2006)
Repository Citation
Oldfather, Chad M., "Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation" (2006). Faculty Publications. Paper 544.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/544

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

Florida Law Review
Founded 1948
Formerly
University of Florida Law Review
V O LU M E 58

S EPTEM BER 2006

N UM BER 4

REMEDYING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM: OPINIONS AS
INFORMATIONAL REGULATION
Chad M. Oldfather*
I.

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 744

II.

DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM : THE ELEMENTS OF
THE ADJUDICATIVE DUTY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A.
B.
C.
D.

III.

. . . . . . . . 749
An Overview of the Dominant Models of Adjudication . . . 750
1. The Classic Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 751
2. The Public Law Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 752
The Models’ Common Conception of the Adjudicative
Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 754
Justification and Elaboration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 756
The Adjudicative Duty Summarized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 758

TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON APPELLATE ADJUDICATION
AND THEIR DECLINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 758
A. Legal Standards and the Problems of Enforcement . . . . . 759
B. The Traditional Appellate Process and Informal
Constraints on Adjudication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764
C. The Crisis of Volume and the Weakening of
Informal Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 768
1. Changes Affecting the Decision-Making Process . . . . 769

* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. A.B., Harvard, J.D., Virginia.
The author can be contacted at chad.oldfather@post.harvard.edu. Thanks to Vik Amar, Paula
Dalley, Art Lefrancois, Scott Moss, CJ Peters, Bill Richman, and Spencer Waller for reviewing
prior drafts and otherwise offering helpful suggestions, and to participants in presentations at the
law schools at Drake University, Marquette University, the University of Minnesota, Oklahoma
City University, and the University of Toledo, as well as at the 2004 Central States Law Schools
Association Annual Meeting.
743

744

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 58

2. Changes Affecting the Ability to Monitor . . . . . . . . . . 771
3. Effects on Fulfillment of the Adjudicative Duty . . . . . 775
IV.

JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS INFORMATIONAL REGULATION . . . . . . 779
A. An Overview of Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 780
1. The Benefits of Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . . 782
2. The Costs of Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . . . . 785
3. The Importance of Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 786
B. Judicial Opinions as Informational Regulation . . . . . . . . . 787
1. Devices for the Creation of Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . 788
2. Devices to Facilitate Monitoring of Adjudication . . . . 790
3. Devices to Affect Performance of the Judicial
Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 792

V.

FRAMING ARGUMENTS—USING THE OPINION FORM
TO RESTORE ADJUDICATIVE LEGITIMACY . . . . . . . . .

VI.

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 801

. . . . . . . 794
A. Framing Arguments as a Means to Combat
Judicial Inactivism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 796
1. Effects on the Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . 796
2. Effects on Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 797
3. Additional Benefits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798
a. Improved Advocacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 798
b. Enhanced Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 799
B. Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 800

I. INTRODUCTION
Concern about so-called “judicial activism” is rampant.1 Despite a lack
of consensus regarding precisely what the term means,2 those wielding it
have in mind judges who overstep the bounds of their role.3 “Activist”

1. Searches of the Westlaw “allnews” database conducted on March 31, 2006 revealed 2,571
documents using the phrase “judicial activism” in 2005 alone, and 2,159 using the phrases “activist
judge” or “activist judges” in that same time period.
2. See generally Keenan D. Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial
Activism,” 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (identifying five distinct “core meanings” of the term).
3. See, e.g., David B. Sentelle, Judge Dave & The Rainbow People, 3 GREEN BAG 61, 61
(1999) (noting conservative “concerns about activist liberal judges who overstep the proper bounds
of office and try to be legislators and executives”); Book Note, A Bold Leap Backward?, 108
HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2049 (1995) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS:
HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994) and
noting Glendon’s condemnation of “the unprovoked activism of judges who overstep their
bounds.”).
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judges usurp the authority of the political branches, decide issues not
properly before them, and generally do more than is necessary to resolve
the disputes they face. Legal scholarship has tended to reflect these
concerns, with most of the debate over the proper functions of courts
directed toward defining the outer bounds of the judicial power.4
In contrast, what might be termed “judicial inactivism”—judges doing
less than their role requires—receives little systematic attention.5 This is
somewhat curious. A judicial failure to act—such as when a court fails to
address one of the claims before it—preserves the status quo, which can
be every bit as consequential as the changes to the status quo resulting
from judicial action. If it is legitimate to be concerned about judicial action
that exceeds proper limits, then it should be equally legitimate to be
concerned about improper judicial inaction. Indeed, because a court that
fails to act will generally be less obtrusive than a court that does act,
perhaps judicial inactivism should receive more attention than judicial
activism.
This is not to suggest that law journals are utterly bereft of articles
suggesting that courts are doing less than what is (or should be) required
of them. The literature concerning the processes of appellate courts, for
example, consistently bemoans the fact that the appellate process no
longer includes many of the features once thought integral to appellate
adjudication.6 Courts no longer hear oral argument or issue published,
precedential opinions in every case, and the opinions they do issue are as
much or more the product of law clerks than the judges themselves.7
These phenomena, however, are but mere symptoms of the larger
problem, which is that caseloads have expanded at a rate far greater than
the judiciary itself.8 Judges consequently have considerably less time to
devote to each case than their predecessors. What has resulted might be
characterized as involving multiple varieties of judicial inactivism. The
systemic failure to accord cases the same level of process as in the past
could be viewed as a generalized form of inactivism. At the level of the
individual case, the combination of time pressure and reduced judicial
engagement might result in inaction flowing from courts’ inability to
recognize meritorious issues for what they are. Most dramatically, the
4. See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REV. 227, 259 (1990) (noting the
tendency to regard “Article III solely as a limitation on the courts, and not as an exhortation to
perform certain tasks”); Neal Katyal, Sunsetting Judicial Opinions, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1237,
1237 (2004) (“Contemporary constitutional law in its quest for judicial restraint, has primarily
focused on ‘the how’ of judging—what interpretive methods will constrain the decisionmaker?”).
5. See Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism: Models of Adjudication and the
Duty to Decide, 94 GEO. L.J. 121, 123 n.4 (2005).
6. See infra Part III.B-C.
7. See infra Part III.C.
8. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
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bureaucratization and impersonalization of the process have led to an
atmosphere in which it is easy to imagine judges willfully avoiding
potentially meritorious issues simply because of a lack of effective
mechanisms to prevent them from doing so. Overall, nearly everyone
agrees the quality of appellate justice has suffered.9
Reform proposals have abounded.10 Indeed, many of the systemic
features now considered part of the problem were themselves reforms.
Underlying nearly all of these reforms and proposed reforms is the idea
that restoring the quality of appellate justice requires restoring to appellate
judges what they no longer enjoy, namely adequate time to devote to their
cases.11 Thus each reform effort seeks to return some of that lost time to
judges, such as by directing a portion of the caseload elsewhere12 or
shifting a portion of the process of adjudication to other courts or to nonjudicial personnel.13
What is largely absent from this prior work is consideration of the
asserted problems and proposed reforms in light of a deeper conception of
what the appellate process, or adjudication more generally, ought to
achieve. This Article seeks to fill that gap. Rather than simply working on
the assumption that restoring adjudicative legitimacy requires lessening
judicial workloads, it first draws on prominent models of American
adjudication to articulate a vision of the “adjudicative duty”—the minimal
components of legitimate adjudication.14 Despite the distinctly different
emphases of those models, they share a common conception of courts’
minimum obligations that is rooted primarily in the value each accords to
party participation. This conception includes a duty to be at least “weakly
responsive” to the parties’ claims, meaning that a judicial decision should
squarely confront the parties’ proofs and arguments even if the court
concludes the case is more properly resolved on other grounds. It also
includes a strong preference for the court to provide full and candid
elaboration on the reasons for its decision. None of this, it bears noting,
involves a prescription that courts engage in adjudicative conduct that
differs substantially from the behavior we intuitively expect from judges.
We sense that courts should grapple with the contentions the parties put
before them and that judicial opinions should accurately reflect that
process. Thus, the value of articulating the adjudicative duty lies not in

9. See infra Part III.C.3.
10. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
11. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 185 (2d ed.
1996) (“The idea that the nation will suffer if judges do not have as much time for each case as they
once did is integral to the ideology of the American legal profession.”).
12. See infra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
14. See infra Part II.
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discovering new things that judges ought to be doing, but rather in
revealing the theoretical underpinnings for and fundamental nature of
those things we have reflexively viewed as part of the judging process.
Having identified the minimal components of legitimate adjudication,
the Article next takes up the question of whether current institutional
arrangements are up to the task of ensuring that courts routinely act in
conformity with the adjudicative duty. The analysis reveals that previous
commentators’ concerns about the consequences of modifications to the
appellate process are legitimate. When appellate adjudication more closely
resembled the idealized conception on which most critiques are based, it
almost certainly generated consistent compliance with the adjudicative
duty. This was not simply because judges had more time. Instead, it
resulted from a cluster of informal mechanisms that allowed for more
effective monitoring of judicial behavior and otherwise worked to
discipline judges to fulfill their obligations.15 Many of the changes to the
appellate process implemented over the last several decades have removed
or impeded the effectiveness of these mechanisms.16 As a result,
reductions in workload alone are unlikely to restore much of what has
been lost.
Such a realization accordingly invites consideration of different means
to reform. This Article focuses on the judicial opinion. Specifically, it
takes up an account of the opinion as an example of informational
regulation, a term used to describe regulatory processes that operate
through the required disclosure of information rather than through more
traditional command-and-control mechanisms.17 The core insight
underlying informational regulation is that the audience for the disclosure
will, by virtue of being better informed, be better positioned to act in
response to the disclosing entity’s conduct, and therefore to shape that
conduct through either market or political channels. At the same time, to
the extent that gathering and preparing the information for disclosure leads
the disclosing entity to consider new information or to process in a
different way information it already possessed, a disclosure requirement
can also have more direct effects on the underlying conduct.
A moment’s reflection reveals that, although the connection has never
been expressly made, judicial opinions serve as a form of informational
regulation of judicial behavior. By disclosing the ostensible justifications
for a court’s decision, an opinion enables the various audiences to which
it is directed to monitor the court’s performance and act in response to it.18
At the same time, the act of writing an opinion disciplines the court to
15.
16.
17.
18.

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.B.2.
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reach, or at least justify, its decision in a more systematic, logical way than
would be the case were judicial decisions rendered in a less formal
manner.19 These points are at least implicit in the literature concerning the
forms and functions of opinions. Analysis of opinions in light of the
developing literature on informational regulation, however, allows for
more refined consideration of how opinions work to shape judicial
behavior, and how today’s modified appellate process renders them less
effective in doing so. That, in turn, provides a basis on which to develop
refinements to the opinion device that direct adjudication toward greater
compliance with the adjudicative duty.
This Article advocates one such refinement. Specifically, it suggests
that the opinion format be modified to include “framing
arguments”—party-generated statements of the issues before the court.20
The inclusion of framing arguments would better harness the
informational-regulatory power of the judicial opinion to steer judicial
behavior toward greater compliance with the adjudicative duty. Judges
required to justify their decisions in the shadow of the parties’
characterizations of the dispute before the court would be more likely not
only to justify, but also to reach those decisions in an appropriately
responsive manner. At the same time, the various audiences to which
opinions are directed could more easily monitor the extent to which
judicial decisions meet the requirements of the adjudicative duty. In short,
while not a cure-all, the use of framing arguments would better align the
informational-regulatory aspects of opinions with the overall goals of the
regulatory regime.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief
overview of the dominant models of American adjudication, extracts from
them a conception of the adjudicative duty, and outlines what the duty
demands from judges. Part III explores the traditional constraints that
operated to encourage compliance with the adjudicative duty in the
appellate context and their demise in the wake of the growth of appellate
caseloads and procedural changes undertaken to cope with that growth.
Part IV develops a conception of judicial opinions as informational
regulation, drawing on the developing literature concerning informational
regulation as well as that relating to the forms and functions of judicial
opinions. Finally, Part V introduces the concept of framing arguments and
outlines how the implementation of such a device would operate to bring
adjudication back toward greater compliance with the adjudicative duty.

19. See infra Part IV.B.3.
20. See infra Part V.
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II. DEFINING JUDICIAL INACTIVISM : THE ELEMENTS OF THE
ADJUDICATIVE DUTY
Any assessment of institutional design and function requires
consideration of institutional purpose.21 In the case of American civil
adjudication there are two acknowledged, fundamental purposes. The first
is providing a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of disputes.22 The
second is the creation and refinement of legal standards to be used as rules
by which disputes are resolved, and by which members of society can
align their future conduct.23 These goals stand in tension with one another.
Fulfillment of the dispute resolution function does not require, and may be
hindered by, a focus extending beyond the precise dispute before the court.
But because our system of precedent obligates a court to resolve future
cases in a manner consistent with its resolution of a present case, a court
may find it difficult to resolve a given present case in an appropriate
manner without undesirably restricting its decisional options in future
cases. A court may accordingly face incentives toward what might be
characterized as “judicial inactivism.” That is, a court might prefer not to
confront a claim the resolution of which it fears might cause future
difficulties by creating a troublesome precedent, or as to which it might
have to reach a result that it considers distasteful but which is nonetheless
compelled by existing law. In these situations the court might, in effect,
decide not to decide by attempting to avoid the claim altogether or to
recharacterize the dispute between the parties so as to gloss over its
troublesome aspects. One can also imagine such a failure to decide having
less sinister origins. Judicial inactivism might simply result from
inattention or inadvertence. As judges have faced ever-growing caseloads,
and consequently have to supervise ever-growing staffs, the opportunities
for things to “fall through the cracks” undoubtedly have also increased.
Whether intended or not, such conduct seems incompatible with
21. As Thomas Baker notes in his comprehensive study of the federal appellate courts:
[T]here is an argument to be made that the most relevant enterprise in court
reform is to articulate how the ideal court system would function. . . . This is the
essential purpose of theory: to further the understanding of the contemporary
reality; to assist in choosing among different futures; to begin to appreciate the
uncertainties among the choices; and to come to realize the limits on the power
to choose.
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS 27 (1994).
22. See Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937, 937-38
(1975); Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.
301, 303-06 (1989).
23. See Scott, supra note 22, at 938-49; Sward, supra note 22, at 306-08.
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prevailing notions of the judicial role, in which courts are obligated to
resolve the matters brought before them regardless of the consequences of
doing so.24 But perhaps these notions are misguided. Perhaps, the public
and parties’ expectations to the contrary, courts may properly elect not to
decide. This Part seeks to address the question whether (and if so, when)
courts enjoy an inherent ability to avoid their decisional responsibilities,
and, more generally, to determine what those responsibilities are.25 In
undertaking that task I first discuss the dominant theoretical conceptions
of American adjudication in an effort to gain a somewhat more refined
sense of what adjudication is meant to accomplish and what mechanisms
are critical to its doing so. Although these models exhibit important
differences both descriptively and normatively, they share significant
commonalities which bear on the resolution of these issues. I next draw on
these commonalities to articulate what I have called the “adjudicative
duty”—the minimal components of legitimate adjudication. Arguably
then, “judicial inactivism” consists of the failure to satisfy this duty.
A. An Overview of the Dominant Models of Adjudication
The tension between the dispute resolution and law declaration
functions of courts accounts for much of the variance among the
conceptions of adjudication that have been formulated over the years.26
These conceptions fall into two primary categories. The first is embodied
in the “classic” model of adjudication, which places relatively greater
emphasis on dispute resolution. The second underlies the “public law”
model, which subordinates resolution of the precise dispute before the
court to the formulation and implementation of norms in the interest of

24. Judge Posner recently observed:
I have had the experience—I think all judges have—that sometimes when I start
to work on a case I am uncertain how it should be decided—it seems a toss-up. Yet
I have to decide (the duty to decide is the primary judicial duty), and the longer
I work on the case, the more comfortable I become with my decision.
Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term: Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 31, 56 (2005) (emphasis added); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 173 (2d ed. 1986) (noting that courts of
general jurisdiction must “resolve all controversies within their jurisdiction, because the alternative
is chaos”); Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 716, 732 (2001) (suggesting that the federal
courts of appeals lack a general ability to avoid adjudicating the claims brought before them).
25. See Oldfather, supra note 5.
26. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 1-7 (1985) (categorizing theories of adjudication based on the relative
prominence each assigns to the dispute resolution and law declaration functions).
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society more generally. These differing emphases lead to distinct
conceptions of the judicial role. While the classic and public law models
are not the only models of adjudication, and cannot fully explain the entire
present universe of adjudication,27 they nonetheless remain the dominant
conceptions, and the most fully developed.
1. The Classic Model
Perhaps the most prominent formulation of the classic model is Lon
Fuller’s. In his classic article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,28
Fuller argues that “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in
the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation
in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a
decision in his favor.”29 For Fuller, then, the key to adjudicative legitimacy
is enhancing party participation.30 This necessarily leads not merely to a
judicial orientation toward the dispute between the parties, but toward that
dispute as the parties have characterized it. This in turn requires not only
that judicial decisions must “meet the test of reason,”31 but also that they
should strive to reach those decisions on the grounds argued by the
parties.32 If a court fails to do so, Fuller argues, “then the adjudicative
process has become a sham, for the parties’ participation in the decision
has lost all meaning.”33 Fuller’s emphasis on participation likewise leads
him to advocate the issuance of opinions articulating the reasons behind
27. For example, although mass tort litigation is often treated or characterized as simply a
variant of public law litigation, there are significant differences between the two that make the latter
a poor template for the former. See Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation:
The New Private Law Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 426-29 (1999)
(identifying seven significant distinctions between mass tort litigation and public law litigation as
conceived by the model). For other works articulating alternative models of adjudication, or some
portion of the process of litigation, see, for example, Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 376, 378-80 (1982); William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89
GEO. L.J. 371, 372 (2001); David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big
Case and Institutional Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015, 1016-17 (2004).
28. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978). Of
course, as Robert Bone has pointed out, Fuller’s model is not the pure dispute resolution model it
is often portrayed to be. See Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False
Dichotomy Between Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV.
1273, 1275 (1995) (arguing not only that Fuller’s theory is not an embodiment of the dispute
resolution model, but that it more closely resembles the public law model).
29. See Fuller, supra note 28, at 364.
30. Id. (“Whatever heightens the significance of this participation lifts adjudication toward
its optimum expression. Whatever destroys the meaning of that participation destroys the integrity
of adjudication itself.”).
31. Id. at 366-67.
32. Id. at 388.
33. Id.
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the decision, which give the parties assurance that their participation was
meaningful to the decision and thus are generally necessary to ensure the
parties and the public that the process is functioning as it should.34
Melvin Eisenberg suggests that three norms emerge from Fuller’s
conceptualization.35 First, courts should “attend to what the parties have
to say.”36 Only by gaining an understanding of the parties’ arguments can
the court fully honor their participation.37 Second, an adjudicator should
“explain his decision in a manner that provides a substantive reply to what
the parties have to say.”38 Judicial opinions, on this view, are important
primarily because they reassure the parties that their participation was
meaningful.39 Third, a court’s decision should “be strongly responsive to
the parties’ proofs and arguments in the sense that it should proceed from
and be congruent with those proofs and arguments.”40 This means not only
that judicial decisions should rest, to as great an extent as possible, on the
grounds argued by the parties, but also that the judicial role more generally
should involve a reactive rather than proactive stance.41 A proactive judge
might form preconceptions about what is important in a case, and thereby
reduce the significance of party participation.
2. The Public Law Model
The “public law” model was initially introduced by Abram Chayes in
his seminal article The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation.42 The
model grew out of the reality that much of the activity taking place in
courts at the time Chayes wrote bore little resemblance to litigation as
envisioned by the classic model.43 Rather than private parties squaring off
over the application of private rights, public law litigation in its
prototypical sense involves groups of plaintiffs seeking to enforce
constitutional or statutory rights against a governmental entity.44 The
paradigm case under the classic model is a tort or contract suit between

34. Id. at 387-88.
35. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Consultative Process:
An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 411-12 (1978).
36. Id. at 411.
37. Id. at 412.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 412-13.
42. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976).
43. Id. at 1283-84. As Chayes put it, much of this litigation is “recognizable as a lawsuit only
because it takes place in a courtroom before an official called a judge.” Id. at 1302.
44. Id. at 1284.
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two private parties.45 Under the public law model, the paradigmatic case
involves an effort to reform an institution, such as to desegregate a school
system or improve prison conditions.46 Differences in the very nature of
these disputes necessarily lead to operational differences in the judicial
role. The inquiry in a typical private dispute under the classic model is
focused and retrospective. The questions involve concerns such as what
happened, whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, and whether
the parties satisfied their contractual obligations. In a public law case, by
contrast, the inquiry is more prospective and predictive. Rather than
determining the appropriate amount of compensation for a past injury, the
court must fashion a remedy to be implemented on an ongoing basis. Such
remedies are “forward looking, fashioned ad hoc on flexible and broadly
remedial lines,”47 and consequently require continual judicial involvement
over the course of their administration.48
Another important distinction between adjudication under the two
models lies in the degree to which courts can and should rely on the parties
to characterize and limit the contours of the dispute. For instance, if the
litigants in a contract dispute should happen to mischaracterize the nature
of their dispute or overlook important facts or doctrine, the consequences
fall almost entirely on them. In contrast, public law cases often have direct
implications for people and entities who may not be parties to the lawsuit.
The named plaintiff or plaintiffs may only constitute a portion of those
who will be affected by the outcome of the litigation, and some of those
affected might have interests and concerns that diverge from the
plaintiff’s.49 Alternatively, the named plaintiff’s view of the problem may
lead her to bring the suit against different or fewer defendants than might
other potentially affected parties.50 Either eventuality leads to a situation
in which the appropriate interests, conceived of as those that will be
affected by the outcome of the litigation, are not before the court. This
requires the judge in public law litigation to be more proactive in order to
ensure that all relevant viewpoints are represented. It may, for example,
require the judge to “construct a broader representational framework” by
involving more parties in the litigation, as well as procuring the assistance
of special masters and experts.51 In either case, the judge must depart from
45. See id. at 1285.
46. Id. at 1284.
47. Id. at 1302.
48. Id.
49. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term: Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 25 (1979).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 26-27. As Chayes described it, “The judge is the dominant figure in organizing and
guiding the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a wide
range of outsiders—masters, experts, and oversight personnel.” Chayes, supra note 42, at 1284.
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the norm of strong responsiveness to make up for these deficiencies.
B. The Models’ Common Conception of the Adjudicative Duty
These are very different conceptions of the judicial role, and one might
reasonably question whether it is possible to extract from them any
consistent vision of courts’ adjudicative responsibilities. Indeed, the
relationship between the classic and public law models—in both its
descriptive and normative senses—is unclear.52 Yet the debate surrounding
the models obscures important commonalities. Despite their differences,
the models share a basic understanding of courts’ minimal obligations.
The most significant feature of this common ground is the value that
each model places on party participation. While Fuller’s version of the
classic model makes participation its centerpiece,53 the public law
literature’s emphasis on the possibility that the parties will often fail to
represent (or misrepresent) the interests of everyone who will be affected
by litigation54 obscures the fact that party participation remains critical to
the proper functioning of the adjudicative process even under the public
law model. This is so for two reasons. First, participation has significant
52. There are at least three possibilities. The first is that the models relate to distinct
phenomena. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 149-50. On this view, the classic model may still
represent the ideal in the context of traditional disputes between private parties over private rights,
with the modifications to the adjudicative role associated with the public law model being
appropriate in cases sharing some or all of the key features of institutional reform litigation. Id. at
150. If this is so, then the answer to the question of whether a particular feature of adjudication is
normatively desirable will often depend on the type of litigation in which the feature is employed.
The second possibility is that the emergence of the public law model represented not merely a
limited evolution of the adjudicative mechanism to account for discrete types of litigation, but
rather was symptomatic of a more fundamental shift in the nature of the judicial role. Id. at 150-51.
Whether in connection with a generalized increase in the role of government in society, see Chayes,
supra note 42, at 1288, or a more nuanced appreciation of the effects of litigation on non-parties,
the orientation of the judicial role might have changed to require a focus extending well beyond the
immediate parties even in what appear to be purely private disputes. Indeed, Owen Fiss, who was
as instrumental as Chayes in the articulation and development of the public law model, insists that
was always accurate as an account of adjudication’s aims. See Fiss, supra note 49, at 29. As he puts
it: “[C]ourts exist to give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.” Id. Under this
view, the classic model would be at worst a relic of an earlier time, and at best something of an
emasculated default model, whose prescriptions would hold only where not supplanted by the
public law position to which the system has evolved. A third possibility is that both the models and
the features of adjudication they describe are interrelated. Oldfather, supra note 5, at 151-52.
Neither, standing alone, may fully capture the essential nature of adjudication so much as highlight
its alternative, conflicting aspects. As Meir Dan-Cohen puts this view: “Far from being descriptive
or normative alternatives, the two models are complementary, representing adjudication as a Janusfaced institution. In conjunction, the two models reflect a view of the judicial process as ridden with
tension.” Dan-Cohen, supra note 26, at 5.
53. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
54. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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instrumental value. The parties, simply because they want to win, have an
incentive to present the strongest case they can, and will typically be in the
best position to bring developed arguments and pertinent information to
the court.55 While the representational deficiencies inherent in public law
litigation may render these arguments and information incomplete, the
parties nonetheless remain best situated to provide the court with the
inputs it needs. An adjudicative process that consistently fails to credit this
participation will not only discourage those in the best position to provide
information from doing so, but may ultimately result in the demise of the
adjudicative mechanism itself by leading those who would otherwise bring
suit to seek redress through alternative channels, or perhaps to abandon
their grievances entirely. Second, participation may have inherent or
symbolic value. As Chayes suggests, participation may stand as a good in
its own right by helping to justify judicial, as opposed to political,
involvement in public law matters.56
Consideration of the models’ commonalities in light of the larger
dispute resolution and law declaration functions of adjudication allows for
formulation of the basic contours of the adjudicative duty. Briefly stated,
courts must (at a minimum) decide the claims presented by the parties in
a “weakly responsive” manner. Recall that Eisenberg characterizes
Fuller’s model as calling for “strongly responsive” decisions, meaning
decisions that “proceed from and [are] congruent with [the parties’] proofs
and arguments.”57 “Weak responsiveness, in contrast,” describes an
obligation
to attend to the parties’ proofs and arguments—to gain an
understanding of them and to bear them in mind during the
decisional process—but [does] not preclude the consideration
of other information. A weakly responsive court could thus
decide a case on grounds of its own formulation, and its
obligation to the parties would be satisfied by giving due
consideration to the parties’ arguments and reaching a
reasoned conclusion that those arguments do not provide an
appropriate basis for resolution.58
A court that is weakly responsive honors and rewards party
participation in accordance with the prescriptions of both the classic and
public law models. Moreover, it must come to a full understanding of the
dispute between the parties as they perceive it. Thus, weak responsiveness

55.
56.
57.
58.

See Fiss, supra note 49, at 29-30; Chayes, supra note 42, at 1308.
See Chayes, supra note 42, at 1308-09.
Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 412.
Oldfather, supra note 5, at 168.
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preserves the crucial elements of the dispute resolution function.59 At the
same time, weak responsiveness facilitates lawmaking at least insofar as
the court’s reasoning is reflected in an opinion. Even if a court concludes
that the parties have mischaracterized their dispute or have failed to fully
represent the full array of interests and considerations properly to be
considered in resolving the issues presented, a court’s public engagement
with the parties’ arguments enhances understanding of what the law is by
providing information regarding what the law is not.60 Put differently, a
court’s responsiveness to parties who the court concludes have missed the
point has value from a lawmaking perspective because, for example, it
signals to future litigants that they should likewise not view their similar
dispute in the same way that the present parties incorrectly did.
C. Justification and Elaboration
Of course, it is one thing to say that courts should go about the process
of adjudication in a certain way, and another to ensure that they actually
do so. Much of adjudication involves processes that are purely mental, and
thus hidden from scrutiny. Because we cannot directly monitor or control
an important component of the adjudicative process, we must rely on
secondary mechanisms to shape judicial conduct. Some of these are
informal. As the next Part explores, traditionally a combination of
structural and other institutional features has operated to produce at least
rough compliance with the adjudicative duty. Other constraints are more
formal, including the most prominent device for monitoring courts—the
judicial opinion.61
Nearly all of the information available to the public concerning the
workings of the judicial process comes in the form of judicial opinions.62
This has a number of implications for the formulation of the adjudicative
duty.63 First, it suggests that the fact that a court has reached its decision
in a weakly responsive fashion may not be enough. In most cases, courts
should provide public elaboration on the reasoning behind their decisional
59. One could argue that adjudication is necessarily weakly responsive (and never strongly
responsive) in this sense. That is, the parties will almost never share the same conception of the
precise nature of the dispute between them (otherwise they would likely not be before the court).
Most cases will thus present situations in which “the claims which compete for judicial
endorsement cannot . . . be commensurated without recharacterizing them in a way that alters their
essential meaning for the parties involved.” ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING
IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 340 (1993). In these situations, strong responsiveness may
represent only an unachievable ideal simply because it would be impossible for a court’s decision
to proceed from the proofs and arguments of both parties.
60. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 173.
61. See id. at 175.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 175-80.
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processes.64 Only then can the parties be certain that their participation was
meaningful, in the sense that the court’s decision was at least weakly
responsive to their arguments.65 Elaboration is likewise strongly preferred
under the public law model’s conception of adjudication as extending to
matters beyond the simple resolution of a dispute between the parties
before the court.66 Whether the paramount aim is to guide the development
of the law, give meaning to public values, or govern ongoing relations
between a class of plaintiffs and a governmental institution, some
elaboration on the justifications for a court’s decision is critical to
fulfillment of the judicial function.67 Second, it suggests the need for
judicial candor. That is, when courts do provide such elaboration, the
reasons they give for their decisions should, to as great an extent as is
practicable, be the “real” reasons for the decision.68 Even aside from the
basic ethical point that lying is bad, and perhaps particularly so when
engaged in by the branch of government responsible for interpreting the
law,69 there are instrumental justifications for a candor requirement.
Effective monitoring of the judiciary and effective maintenance of the
system of precedent depend on knowing why courts act as they do. Only
with this knowledge can the public and other branches of government
assess the appropriateness of the courts’ reasoning, and take appropriate
steps in response.70 The ability of private actors to structure their affairs in
accordance with the law likewise depends on knowing that courts will
resolve disputes in accordance with publicly stated legal standards rather
than some other unarticulated criteria.

64. See id. at 175-77.
65. Fuller suggests that elaboration is a preferred, though not essential, component of
adjudication for this reason. See Fuller, supra note 28, at 387-88; see also Oldfather, supra note 5,
at 176 (discussing the implications of the classic model for the elaboration component of the
adjudicative duty).
66. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 176.
67. See id. at 176-77.
68. See id. at 155-60, 180. For more comprehensive discussions of judicial candor, see
generally Scott C. Idleman, A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1307 (1995)
(rejecting a strict requirement of candor in support of judicial discretion in order to ultimately
preserve institutional legitimacy); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 731 (1987) (discussing the relationship between scholarship and adjudication which leads to
the justification of less judicial candor to promote other goals).
69. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J. 353,
401-02 (1989) (“[T]he unspoken premise for almost all of the prior calls for candor, is that
deception in judging undermines the integrity of the judiciary. The almost universal condemnation
of lying suggests that those who call for judicial candor have staked out the moral high ground.”
(footnotes omitted)).
70. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 155-56.
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D. The Adjudicative Duty Summarized
This brief consideration of the dominant models of adjudication in the
American system reveals a common, consistent conception of the minimal
components of legitimate adjudication. Courts must honor party
participation, but need not be constrained by its limits. While strong
responsiveness might be preferred, weak responsiveness is required. A
court that failed to confront a claim or that resolved it by glossing over its
troublesome aspects has failed to satisfy its adjudicative duty. The duty
instead requires the court to engage the parties’ arguments, and if it
concludes that those arguments do not provide the appropriate basis for
decision, it must base that conclusion on appropriate criteria. Absent
compelling circumstances, the court must also provide a candid public
statement of the reasons behind its decision. Only then will it be even
remotely possible for the parties and the public to monitor whether the
underlying decisional process is consistent with the duty.
None of this should strike those familiar with the American legal
system as revolutionary. The value of elucidating the components of the
adjudicative duty stems not from any prescriptions of behavior different
from what we intuitively expect courts to do, but rather in providing a
theoretical grounding on which to base those intuitions. A court acting in
a manner consistent with the adjudicative duty will look like a court doing
what we have been conditioned to believe courts should do (and, one
presumes, actually do in nearly all their cases).71 Thus an appellate court
faced with six contentions need not address more than one if that is all that
is necessary to dispose of the case. Nor, if resolution of all six contentions
is necessary, must the court treat each of the six to a lengthy discussion in
its opinion. The court should both engage with the parties’ arguments and
give the appearance of having engaged with the parties’ arguments. This
is, by and large, how most judicial opinions strive to portray the process,
even if we suspect that it is at least occasionally an inaccurate portrayal.
III. TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS ON APPELLATE ADJUDICATION
AND THEIR DECLINE
Despite this underlying consistency in our understanding of the
minimal components of legitimate adjudication, as we shall soon see there
is no body of law that imposes on courts a set of obligations consistent
with the adjudicative duty. Perhaps because of the difficulties associated
71. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 33 (1941) (“The bar
generally and with much reason feel it important that the reasons of every decision of consequence
in our highest courts be set forth fully in written opinions, accessible to the profession and the
public and that the courts should pronounce definitely upon every point raised by counsel, even if
no more than to state it and declare it irrelevant.”).
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with enforcing such a legal requirement, we have instead relied on a set of
procedural and informal constraints to discipline the judicial process. This
Part begins by examining the law, such as it is, relating to the adjudicative
duty, and considering the enforcement difficulties that render courts’
statements regarding their adjudicative obligations largely aspirational if
not merely ornamental. It then outlines the traditional constraints arising
from institutional design that historically operated to discipline the
appellate judicial process toward rough compliance with the adjudicative
duty. Finally, it considers how the process has developed away from its
traditional forms as appellate courts have struggled to cope with massive
increases in their caseloads over the past half-century, and how those
changes have affected courts’ satisfaction of the adjudicative duty.
A. Legal Standards and the Problems of Enforcement
Courts tend, perhaps unsurprisingly, to be less than effusive in
describing their adjudicative obligations.72 This is not to suggest that there
are no cases in which courts acknowledge the existence of such obligations
and speak to their content. There are such cases, although not many, and
on the whole they recognize a set of adjudicative goals consistent with
what I have outlined above. As we will see, however, these statements are
largely aspirational, in significant part because of the lack of effective
remedies for denials of the “rights” to which they refer.
What emerges from the relative handful of opinions speaking to the
topic of adjudicative obligations can be stated quite simply: Courts must
decide cases over which they have jurisdiction.73 As Chief Justice Marshall
put it in Cohens v. Virginia:
With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may
be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction
which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution. Questions
may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot
avoid them.74
While all of this sounds promising, Cohens and cases making similar

72. See generally Martha I. Morgan, The Constitutional Right to Know Why, 17 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 297 (1982) (discussing courts’ general reluctance to impose upon themselves a
requirement to provide reasons for their decisions).
73. See ANNOTATED MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(1) (2004) (“A judge
shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is
required.”).
74. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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statements are more aberrational than they are emblematic of a body of
law relating to the adjudicative duty. Cohens, for example, is typically
cited in support of the “doctrine of necessity” in cases of judicial
disqualification rather than as the bedrock of a broadly applicable duty.75
Further examination reveals that, even if Cohens and its progeny are taken
to support an adjudicative duty, that duty is rather flexible. It is clear, for
example, that appellate courts operate under no obligation to be strongly
responsive in Fuller’s sense of generating decisions constrained by the
proofs and arguments of the parties.76 Indeed, any suggestion to the
contrary must confront the fact that courts routinely engage in sua sponte
decision making. In such cases a court might reach a decision based not
merely on a different understanding of a claim asserted by the parties, but
rather based on a “claim” that the parties did not raise at all.77
One can tell a similar story with respect to judicial statements that
appear to mandate something akin to weak responsiveness. For example,
within the past decade two federal appellate courts have endorsed the
proposition that a litigant has a “right to have all issues fully considered

75. See, e.g., United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980) (discussing the history of
the rule of necessity); Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Hawkins, 775 So. 2d 101, 104-05 (Miss. 2000)
(McRae, J., dissenting) (quoting Cohens and surveying cases adopting the rule of necessity);
Betensky v. Opcon Assocs., Inc., 738 A.2d 1171, 1176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (“Given the fact
that courts have an institutional obligation to hear and decide the cases brought before them, the
common law long ago created what is referred to in judicial disqualification cases as the rule of
necessity. Stated succinctly, the rule of necessity is that if everyone is disqualified, no one is
disqualified. Thus, in a judicial salary case, where all judges by definition have an interest in the
outcome of the case, the judge assigned the case has a duty to hear and decide the case, however
disagreeable that task might be.”). There is likewise relatively little case law relating to Canon
3(B)(1) of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct. See ABA, Annotated Model Code, supra note 73,
at 87-88.
76. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. “When an issue or claim is properly before
the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced by the parties, but rather
retains the independent power to identify and apply the proper construction of governing law.”
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991). The Supreme Court has justified this
as necessary to ensure that the parties do not have the ability through either inadvertence or
collusion to frame the claims in such a way that any opinion strongly responsive to the parties’
arguments would be of dubious legal provenance. See U.S. Nat’l Bank v. Indep. Ins. Agents of
Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 447 (1993). Such an opinion would not only be of questionable
precedential effect, but would also introduce an element of confusion into related bodies of law.
77. For recent overviews and criticisms of this practice, see generally Adam A. Milani &
Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte Decisions By Appellate Courts, 69
TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002) (rejecting the use of sua sponte decisions because it undermines due
process, the adversary process, and constitutes an abuse of judicial discretion); Barry A. Miller, Sua
Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1253 (2002) (discussing the inconsistent manner in which appellate courts raise
issues sua sponte, and its implications on due process and the adversarial system).
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and ruled on by the appellate court” to which the litigant presents them.78
This may be so, but it seems clear that if it is, the court’s obligation is
meant to extend only to the process of making a decision and not the
(arguably) distinct process of justifying that decision.79 Simply put, weak
responsiveness is not a universal feature of judicial opinions. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has vested the federal courts of appeals with “wide latitude
in their decisions of whether or how to write opinions.”80 As a
consequence, not only do the parties to federal litigation have no
entitlement to any opinion at all,81 they have no right to expect that the
court will speak to all their arguments in the event it elects to issue
an opinion.82 The picture is largely the same in the state courts of
78. United States v. Garza, 165 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Bernklau v. Principi,
291 F.3d 795, 801 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting Garza).
79. See, e.g., RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 548 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting
that “the judicial resolution of a legal dispute implicates two separate processes: (1) deciding, or
the process of discovering the conclusion, and (2) justifying, or the process of public exposition of
that conclusion.”). This view is not universally held. See David McGowan, Judicial Writing and
the Ethics of the Judicial Office, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 513 (2001) (asserting “that the
premise that judicial writing can be divorced from deciding or other aspects of judging is wrong”);
see also Oldfather, supra note 5, at 175-80 (contrasting a view of elaboration as evidence of
adjudicative behavior with a view of adjudication as an integral part of adjudicative behavior).
80. Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972) (per curiam).
81. See Furman v. United States, 720 F.2d 263, 264 (2d Cir. 1983) (“There is no requirement
in law that a federal appellate court’s decision be accompanied by a written opinion.”); see also
DAVID G. KNIBB, FEDERAL COURT OF APPEALS MANUAL § 33.2 (4th ed. 2000).
82. One recent case, however, suggests that there is some minimal requirement of
responsiveness once a court decides to issue an opinion. See Bright v. Westmoreland County, 380
F.3d 729, 731-32 (3d Cir. 2004). In Bright v. Westmoreland County, the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded for reconsideration a district court order and opinion that had been prepared by one of
the parties and adopted by the district court with little modification. See id. at 731. The court
observed that:
[J]udicial opinions are the core work-product of judges. . . . They are tangible
proof to the litigants that the judge actively wrestled with their claims and
arguments and made a scholarly decision based on his or her own reason and
logic. When a court adopts a party’s proposed opinion as its own, the court vitiates
the vital purposes served by judicial opinions.
Id. at 732. The court went on to note that it found the case before it especially troubling given the
lack of any evidence that the court’s decision was its own:
In this case, there is no record evidence which would allow us to conclude that the
District Court conducted its own independent review, or that the opinion is the
product of its own judgment. In fact, the procedure used by the District Court
casts doubt on the possibility of such a conclusion.
Id. Noting that this, in turn, casts doubt on the legitimacy of the adjudicative process, the court
categorically disapproved of the practice. See also 21 C.J.S. Courts § 174 (2005).

762

FLO RID A LAW REVIEW

[V ol. 58

appeals.83 Although some states by constitution or statute require that their
courts provide reasons for their decisions,84 even such provisions are not
interpreted to require exhaustive consideration of all the parties’
contentions.85 All of this is manifest in the courts’ output. Appellate courts
routinely dispose of cases via truncated “unpublished” decisions or
minimalistic judgment orders that merely state the result,86 and even full
opinions frequently conclude with a so-called “cleanup phrase”87 along the
lines of “[w]e have considered the remaining issues raised by [appellant],
and find them to be without merit.”88
The flexibility that courts enjoy in their decisions of whether and how
to write opinions underscores a fundamental difficulty with any effort to
implement an adjudicative duty rooted in Cohens and similar cases—
namely, the lack of effective mechanisms for detection of violations and
enforcement of the duty.89 Consider a case in which a party believes that
an appellate court failed to satisfy its obligations in its treatment of a case.
Although appellate panels can grant rehearings, the panel rehearing device
has generally fallen into disuse,90 and in any event a panel that violated the
adjudicative duty is unlikely to be receptive to a petition for rehearing on
those grounds. En banc review and the grant of discretionary review by a
supreme court are equally unlikely. Both events are so rare that, purely as
a statistical matter, the likelihood of intervention by a subsequent judicial

83. See 21 C.J.S. Courts § 171 (2005) (“Except as required by provisions of state
constitutions, statutes, or court rules, opinions need not be written by the court or judge, although
the matter rests in the judicial discretion, as a result of which opinions will be written when
necessary.”).
84. See, e.g., B.E.T., Inc. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 499 A.2d 811, 811 (Del. 1985) (per curiam)
(rejecting a lower court’s adoption of the brief of one of the parties as the opinion of the court as
contrary to Delaware’s requirement that courts provide reasons for their decisions); People v.
Garcia, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 662, 667 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (articulating the contours of the California
Constitution’s requirement “that appellate opinions state the reasons for the disposition”).
85. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sluss v. Appellate Court of Ind., 17 N.E.2d 824, 826 (Ind. 1938)
(noting that it would not presume that the framers of the Indiana Constitution “intended that this
court should be required to exhaust every subject that might be raised on an appeal, without regard
to its importance in the determination of the cause”).
86. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
87. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, OPINION WRITING 87-88 (1990).
88. In re Balfour MacLaine Intern., Ltd., 85 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United
States v. Edmonds, 52 F.3d 1236, 1248 (3d Cir. 1995).
89. David McGowan, who advocates the adoption of ethical rules requiring judges to write
candidly and in such a manner as to resolve the dispute actually before them, recognizes this
problem. See McGowan, supra note 79, at 599-600. Allowing that such rules would be difficult to
enforce, he nonetheless suggests that they would have an effect, offering “a sort of shaming
argument—we enact rules so judges will feel guilty and unjudicial if they do not follow them.” Id.
at 600.
90. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 157.
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body in any given case is small.91 This would be particularly so in the case
of a request based on a violation of the adjudicative duty, where the very
basis for the assertion that further review is necessary is not that something
was done incorrectly in the prior proceeding but rather that something was
not done at all.92 A justice considering whether to grant discretionary
review in the ordinary case can often get a good sense of whether to do so
simply from reading the lower court’s opinion. If that opinion reflects
reasoning that the justice finds troublesome, she will be more likely to
vote to review. If, on the other hand, the need for review is alleged to arise
from the lower court’s failure to address an issue, the justice’s task is more
difficult. Now she must put herself in the place of the lower court and
attempt to replicate its analysis. This is not only difficult, but also
something that the justice likely views as outside the core function of her
court, which is to oversee the development of the law.93 A lower court’s
failure to speak to a claim does not implicate this function. Since it has
said nothing on the issue, the lower court’s inaction has no impact on the
content of the law. A similar analysis holds in the case of en banc review.94
Consistent with all of this, courts have held themselves entitled to a
“presumption of regularity,”95 pursuant to which judges are to assume that
other courts “have properly discharged their official duties”96 absent clear
91. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 83 n.23 (noting that the Supreme Court granted review in
a mere 1.47% of the cases in which petitions for certiorari were filed in 1993); Tracey E. George,
The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213,
214 (1999) (“Circuit courts rarely invoke the en banc procedure; courts of appeals resolve fewer
than one percent of their cases en banc.”); see also Evan Tsen Lee, Principled Decision Making and
the Proper Role of Federal Appellate Courts: The Mixed Questions Conflict, 64 S. CAL. L. REV.
235, 252-53 (1991) (noting the weakness of external constraints on appellate court decision
making).
92. See Mitu Gulati & C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1998, at 157, 166 (noting that, in the case of judgment orders, “[t]he fact that no law was
made also makes it unlikely that either the circuit en banc or the Supreme Court will grant
review.”); cf. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 357 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., & Philip P. Frickey, eds.,
The Foundation Press Inc. 1994) (1958) (noting that, in the case of trial court decisions stated only
as conclusions, “an appellate court will have trouble in reviewing the decision to decide whether
or not it involves error, unless it retraces the whole process of decision de novo”).
93. See DANIEL JOHN MEADOR & JORDANA SIMONE BERNSTEIN, APPELLATE COURTS IN THE
UNITED STATES 26 (1994).
94. En banc review is used primarily to police doctrinal uniformity within a court. See
ROBERT L. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 459-65 (2d ed. 1989) (discussing
the use of and practices related to en banc review); Michael Ashley Stein, Uniformity in the Federal
Courts: A Proposal for Increasing the Use of En Banc Appellate Review, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 805,
808-19 (1993) (discussing the history of en banc review).
95. Bernklau v. Principi, 291 F.3d 795, 801 (quoting Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
96. Butler, 244 F.3d at 1340.
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evidence to the contrary.
Ultimately, then, what at first appear to be statements of a legal duty
to go about the process of adjudication in a certain way amount to little
more than incantations designed to assure the public, and perhaps the
judges themselves, that those responsible for adjudication understand what
their obligations entail. Indeed, courts occasionally suggest that their sense
of responsibility and awareness of what is at stake provides the most
meaningful barrier against the abuses to which the process is subject.97
B. The Traditional Appellate Process and Informal Constraints
on Adjudication
Despite the lack of formal, legal requirements that courts satisfy the
adjudicative duty, appellate courts have historically generated decisions
in a manner generally compliant with the duty.98 This is a product of the
informal constraints imposed by the processes and conditions under which
appellate adjudication has traditionally taken place. These conditions are
reflected in the widely shared understanding of what the idealized
97. See, e.g., NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 430 F.2d 966, 973 (5th Cir. 1970)
(“The Court itself must be vigilant. We believe we are sensitive now to the factors which would
make application of the Rule [allowing judgment orders in certain circumstances] wrong or unwise
or inappropriate. It is the Court’s purpose to heed them and in our own survival assure survival of
the system we cherish.”); see also United States v. Baynes, 548 F.2d 481, 484 (3d Cir. 1977) (per
curiam) (quoting same).
98. I do not want to overstate the empirical claim I make here. I do not mean to suggest that
I have established that these informal constraints forced courts to comply with the adjudicative duty
in any strict sense, or even that it would be possible to do so. As Judge Posner has noted, it is
notoriously difficult to assess whether a judiciary is producing the desired level of justice, even
were we able to agree on what such a concept would entail. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING
LAW 114-15 (1995). As a consequence, we rely on proxies, such as stringent prohibitions against
creating even the appearance of bias, id., and on the types of internal monitoring and informal
sanctions outlined in this Part, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING
APPEALS 19-51 (1960) (articulating and discussing fourteen “major steadying factors” in the
context of appellate adjudication). These proxies and sanctions ultimately result in a process that
generates adjudication consistent with the ideal. As Reynolds and Richman explain:
Full appellate procedure produces benefits beyond insuring correct outcomes by
providing visibility, accountability, and reviewability in ways that truncated
procedures cannot. In particular, oral argument and published opinions reassure
litigants, particularly those most inclined to distrust government officials, that the
judges themselves have carefully considered their appeals. Moreover, selective
distribution of full appellate procedure decreases confidence in the legal system,
and it causes many to suspect that the law has in fact become a “respecter of
persons” and that the judges are not providing equal justice to poor and rich alike.
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, Studying Deck Chairs on the Titanic, 81 CORNELL
L. REV. 1290, 1291-92 (1996) (footnotes omitted).
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appellate process looks like. In the archetypal appellate court,99 each case
is resolved only through the direct, intense efforts of the judges
responsible for its decision. The judges scrutinize the parties’ briefs, test
the parties’ contentions and their own initial impressions at oral argument,
and reach a tentative resolution following a conference among themselves
immediately following the argument.100 Then, one of the judges prepares
a draft opinion and circulates it to the others.101 They in turn review it
carefully, offering comments and suggestions which the authoring judge
takes into account in preparing a revised draft.102 This continues until all
the judges are in agreement, at which point a final opinion is released for
inclusion in the official reporter of the court’s decisions.103
While this idealized form of adjudication may never have been a
generalized reality, it certainly once represented an achievable ideal.104
This was a world of fewer cases, which in turn meant more time for the
sort of contemplation that the model envisions. When every judge on a
panel could devote full attention to every case, and when those judges
shared a consistent sense of their task,105 weak responsiveness was
effectively guaranteed. What is more, the process incorporated various
built-in checkpoints at which the obligation could be reinforced. Consider,
for example, oral argument, which under the idealized version of the
process occurs in every case, and for as long as is necessary for the parties
and the judges to fully explore the issues.106 The process of argument not
only leads occasionally to changed minds and new perspectives, but also
provides the parties with another chance to press their view of the dispute
on the court. If a judge’s thinking about a case has taken a turn away from
the parties’ conception of the issues, counsel can suggest to the court why
99. See William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 278 (1996)
(describing what they call “the Learned Hand model” of appellate judging). For similar depictions
of an idealized conception of appellate adjudication, see COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES
FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT 70 (1998) (describing the assumed
components of the right to appeal prior to the 1960s); BAKER, supra note 21, at 14-17; PAUL D.
CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL 14-16 (1976) (describing “the appellate process when
leisure prevails”). But see Posner, supra note 24, at 66 (suggesting that appellate adjudication “is
not a protracted process unless the judge has difficulty making up his mind, which is a
psychological trait rather than an index of conscientiousness”).
100. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 278.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 278 n.14 (noting that “[a]lthough this ideal vision may never have been
perfectly followed, even on Learned Hand’s court, that court did come quite close to the ideal”).
105. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
106. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 279 (“At one time, argument in a single case
could last several days.”).
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that turn is mistaken, and at least has an opportunity to participate relative
to this new theory.107 Perhaps as significant to the argument’s contribution
to the quality of the decision-making process is the fact that the public
nature of the event creates an incentive for judges to come to a full
understanding of the case so as not to appear unprepared or incompetent
before the public.108 In addition, the nature of oral argument effectively
guarantees that the judges will focus their attention exclusively on the case
under consideration for the full period of the argument.109 And the entire
exercise provides the public with an opportunity to witness, and therefore
monitor, a portion of the court’s decisional process.
Outside of argument, if one judge failed to give appropriate regard to
the parties’ contentions in either his consideration of the case or in the
drafting of an opinion, his fellow judges could be counted on to bring the
matter to his attention. The fact that courts were smaller facilitated this
dynamic.110 The judges on these smaller courts interacted frequently with
one another, and thereby came to know their colleagues well, both
personally and professionally.111 They could accordingly hold their
colleagues more accountable individually, and themselves collectively
more accountable as a court.112 This was also a world of less law, both in
the sense that there were fewer cases, statutes, and regulations, and in the
sense that there were fewer substantive areas of law.113 A judge could be
expected to have more than a passing familiarity with the law in nearly
every case that arose, and to be familiar with the latest cases and other
developments. That likewise made it easier for judges on a court to
monitor the court’s decisional process simply because they were better
positioned to spot opinions that failed to comport with applicable
standards. The bar could also play a more active role as a constraint, and
not only because of the greater opportunities it enjoyed to participate in
argument. Just as the existence of fewer cases and less law enabled more
effective monitoring by judges, so did it allow the bar to serve as a useful

107. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 112-13 (discussing the “systemic costs of the lost oral
argument”).
108. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 161.
109. See id. at 160-62.
110. See id. at 42 (“The more judges there are in a court system, the less responsibly each can
be expected to exercise his power.”).
111. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 29-30 (discussing the advantages of smaller courts); FRANK M. COFFIN, ON
APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 213-29 (1994) (discussing the value of collegiality
and the collegiality-inhibiting effects of the increased size of courts).
112. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 29-30; COFFIN, supra note 111, at 216.
113. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 98-99 (noting the expansion in the number and type of
federal rights since the 1960s).
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monitor. Lawyers as well could realistically expect to keep abreast of the
entirety of a court’s output, such that an aberrational result could not be
expected to go unnoticed by the legal community.114
All of this operated to create a sense of ownership of decisions in both
an individual and collective sense. When each judge was personally
engaged in the decision-making process throughout its course, from
reading the briefs to participating in oral argument to drafting and
reviewing opinions, the work emerging from a judge’s chambers was
unquestionably that judge’s work. At the same time, each judge was able
to monitor the court’s output generally, and to participate in a meaningful
way in the decision-making process as to those cases in which she was not
the authoring judge.115 In addition, the fact that it was a decision-making
process, as opposed to a mechanism designed to generate decisions with
little opportunity for reflection, is significant. As Judge Coffin notes in
lauding the virtues of what he calls “graduated decision-making,” the
idealized appellate process provides at least seven opportunities for a
judge to reconsider her thinking on a case.116 Reflection, reconsideration,
114. An interesting aspect of the history of unpublished opinions is that members of the bar
initially advocated the practice on the grounds that the increasing output of appellate courts made
it difficult to stay abreast of the state of the law. See John P. Borger & Chad M. Oldfather,
Anastasoff v. United States and the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 899,
900-03 (2001).
115. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 31-32 (noting that the process of group decisionmaking in the context of appellate courts tends to result in decisions with greater perspective and
fewer extremes); see also FRANK M. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE: REFLECTIONS FROM THE
FEDERAL APPELLATE BENCH 58-59 (1980) (noting the role of collegiality as a constraint on
decision-making).
116. In Judge Coffin’s words:
One reads a good brief from the appellant; the position seems reasonable. But a
good brief from appellee, bolstered perhaps by a trial judge’s opinion, seems
incontrovertible. Discussion with the law clerks in chambers casts doubt on any
tentative position. Any such doubt may be demolished by oral argument, only to
give rise to a new bias, which in turn may be shaken by the postargument
conference among the judges. As research and writing reveal new problems, the
tentative disposition of the panel of judges may appear wrong. The opinion is
written and circulated, producing reactions from the other judges, which again
change the thrust, the rationale, or even the result. Only when the process has
ended can one say that the decision has been made, after as many as seven turns
in the road. The guarantee of a judge’s impartiality lies not in suspending
judgment throughout the process but in recognizing that each successive judgment
is tentative, fragile, and likely to be modified or set aside as a consequence of
deepened insight. The non-lawyer looks on the judge as a model of decisiveness.
The truth is more likely that the appellate judge in a difficult case is committed to
the unpleasant state of prolonged indecisiveness.
COFFIN, supra note 115, at 63.
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and refinement are built into the process. When coupled with judges who
are, in Karl Llewellyn’s phrasing, “law-conditioned”117—that is, trained
in law and having long experience in the practice of law, and therefore
inclined to approach and resolve problems in a manner consistent with the
mores and expectations of the legal culture—the result is likely to be
consistent with the ideals that undergird the process.
C. The Crisis of Volume and the Weakening of Informal Constraints
However realistic an account of appellate adjudication the idealized
conception might once have been, there is no disputing that it fails as an
accurate description of the process today. The primary cause for this is the
“crisis of volume” afflicting the appellate courts.118 The numbers are
staggering. The federal courts of appeals in 2003 faced more than fifteen
times as many cases as in 1960.119 While the number of judges has
increased over this same period, expansion has not kept pace with the
dockets. Appeals per judge have grown by some 450% over this same
period.120 Whatever the historic ability of courts and judges to engage in
their work at a leisurely pace, present realities clearly do not allow for
unhurried deliberation. Instead, the need to cope with growing caseloads
has led not only to more work for each judge, but also to a number of welldocumented changes to the appellate process.121 Many of these changes,
coupled with the pressures imposed by the need to keep pace with the
docket, have implications for courts’ tendency to satisfy the adjudicative
duty on a consistent basis.

117. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 19-25.
118. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 14 (“Over the last 100 years, filings per appellate judgeship have increased by
almost a factor of six. By contrast, filings per judgeship in the district courts have not even
doubled.”).
119. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS
2003 23 tbl.B-1 (2003) (showing 60,661 cases commenced in the courts of appeals), available at
http://uscourts.gov/library/statisticsalreports.html, with DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 210 tbl.B 1 (1961) (showing 3,899 cases commenced in the courts
of appeals). The statistics relating to appellate caseloads in the state courts are not as welldeveloped, but in general the same sort of upward trend is evident. See, e.g., Thomas B. Marvell,
Is There An Appeal from the Caseload Deluge?, JUDGES’ J., Summer 1985, at 34, 36-37 (indicating
that on average, state trial court filings are doubling about every fifteen to twenty years, and appeals
are doubling each decade).
120. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 14.
121. See generally COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, supra note 99, at 17-25; BAKER, supra note 21, at 106-47; CARRINGTON, ET AL., supra
note 99, at 13-41.
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1. Changes Affecting the Decision-Making Process
Among the most significant consequences of the steps courts have
taken to conserve judicial time and resources is that judges are less able to
act as direct participants throughout the decision-making and opiniongeneration process. To a large degree this is simply a function of having
more cases and thus less time to devote to each one.122 Time for leisurely
reflection is an assumed component of the idealized conception, along
with the notion that more reflection will lead to better results. But leisure
is no longer a feature of the appellate judicial process. The fifteen-fold
increase in the number of cases on the dockets of the federal courts of
appeals since 1960 has not been accompanied by a similar increase in the
number of judges.123 Instead, the number of appellate judges has roughly
doubled.124 The picture is not so uniformly bleak in the state courts, where
many states have been able to address the problems of volume by adding
an intermediate appellate court to what was previously a two-tier
system.125 But it is certainly true in the federal courts, and largely true in
the state courts, that each judge is responsible for considerably more cases
than was his counterpart a half-century ago. The average number of
published opinions authored by a federal appellate judge increased from
thirty-one in 1960 to fifty-four in 1994.126 During that same period the
average number of cases terminated on the merits per active circuit judge
increased from 40.6 to 187.9.127
As these numbers suggest, the crisis in appellate dockets has long since
passed the point where courts merely need to cut down on leisurely
reflection. Instead, the process itself has been modified at nearly every
stage. Oral argument, once available in all cases and for expansive
amounts of time, is now restricted to short time periods in the fifty or sixty
percent of cases where it is available at all.128 This not only deprives the
parties of a significant portion of their opportunity to participate, but also
122. Twenty-five years ago Robert Leflar remarked on the effects of crowded dockets: “Ample
time for thoughtful consideration and reconsideration is scarce. All appeals must be decided, and
decisions must be turned out by the hundreds. In most, reliance upon past precedent or upon
reasonable analogy to the precedent affords the only possible approach.” Robert A. Leflar, Honest
Judicial Opinions, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 721, 741 (1979).
123. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
124. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 14 tbl.2-3 (noting an increase from 88 judges in 1964 to 179 in 1997).
125. See CARRINGTON, ET AL., supra note 99, at 4 (noting the trend in state appellate courts);
MEADOR & BERNSTEIN, supra note 93, at 16-18. See generally Thomas B. Marvell, State Appellate
Court Responses to Caseload Growth, 72 JUDICATURE 282 (1989) (chronicling the growth in state
appellate court caseloads and cataloging the varied responses thereto).
126. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 74.
127. Id.
128. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 109-10; Cooper & Berman, supra note 24, at 700-01.
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removes both an obligation to focus exclusively on each case for a fixed
period of time and an incentive to come to a full understanding of a
case.129
The reduction of the judge’s role in the writing of opinions has been
even greater. In stark contrast to the idealized conception, initial drafts of
appellate opinions today are almost exclusively prepared by law clerks.130
This transformation of the judge from author to editor has likewise
resulted in a reduction in judicial engagement in the fundamental task of
decision making. Opinions drafted by clerks tend to be different from
those drafted by judges in terms of style, length, candor, level of research
and credibility.131 More fundamentally, the act of writing both requires and
engenders a deeper level of engagement with the case.132 However
engaged they might be, it seems indisputable that contemporary judges are
less directly engaged with the cases they must decide than their
predecessors.
These effects are compounded by the increasing involvement of central
court staff in screening cases before they reach the judges.133 The typical
screening mechanism leads to some portion of the docket remaining a
candidate for a more traditional process, while the remainder of cases are
channeled toward settlement or truncated processes involving no oral
argument and memorandum or order opinions, which are often drafted by
staff.134 The cases on this latter track, by design, receive even less judicial
attention. Moreover, opinions drafted by staff attorneys are less apt to

129. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. What is more, many appellate courts
frequently dispense not only with argument, but also with any sort of conference among the judges
in nonargued cases, a practice Judge Posner describes as “insidious” and likely to create a
“tendency to sign on the dotted line with little real consideration of the case . . . .” POSNER, supra
note 11, at 162.
130. Judge Posner reports:
Today, most judicial opinions, including many Supreme Court opinions, are
ghostwritten by law clerks. Many appellate judges have never actually written a
judicial opinion. Some judges do extensive editing of their law clerks’ opinion
drafts, others not, and this is the pattern in the Supreme Court as well as in the
lower courts.
Posner, supra note 24, at 61; see also BAKER, supra note 21, at 139-47; Cooper & Berman, supra
note 24, at 697-99.
131. POSNER, supra note 11, at 145-49.
132. See McGowan, supra note 79, at 513-14.
133. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 139-47 (discussing the role of staff attorneys); Reynolds
& Richman, supra note 98, at 1290-92 (discussing the “truncated procedures” that have resulted
from delegating judges’ work to staff attorneys).
134. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 22.
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approximate the point of view of the judge under whose name they were
written as compared to those drafted by the judge’s personal law clerks.135
Collectively, these developments have increased the distance between
the judge and the decisions the judge must make. Preparation for oral
argument, participation in oral argument, and the writing of an opinion
each represent opportunities for the judge to spend time studying and
analyzing the claims presented in a case. Any opportunity to work with a
problem is likely to reveal wrinkles that may not have been immediately
apparent, and to allow reconsideration of the fit between the problem and
one’s initial sense of its appropriate resolution.136 As resource constraints
and modified procedures render judges less able to do these things, the
process of graduated decision-making becomes more and more a moment
of decision made on the basis of a packaged distillation of information
prepared by others. As we will see, that in turn decreases the likelihood
that courts will consistently satisfy their adjudicative duty.
2. Changes Affecting the Ability to Monitor
Just as the crisis of volume and the procedural changes made in its
wake have increased the distance between the judge and her own work
product, so have they affected her relationship with her colleagues’ work
product. Indeed, the statistics provided in the preceding section regarding
increased workload only tell a portion of the story.137 The average circuit
judge today is not only responsible for considerably more opinions and
other dispositions than her predecessor of several decades ago, but also for
reviewing and commenting on roughly twice that many opinions written
by other members of panels on which she serves, and presumably for a
handful of concurrences and dissents. Meanwhile, she must also pay
attention to the rest of the opinions issued by her court so as to remain
abreast of developments in her jurisdiction, a task that has also
dramatically grown in size.
This alone makes it difficult to adequately monitor all that takes place
on one’s court.138 But there is another, less quantifiable aspect of the

135.
136.
137.
138.

See POSNER, supra note 11, at 152.
See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text.
As Thomas Baker puts it:
Stop to consider the implications from workload and the overall impact of the
coping mechanisms of intramural reforms. There are approximately 250 working
days in a calendar year. In 1990, there were 40,898 appeals decided, a ratio of 247
per judge or nearly one per day. But more significantly these figures yield a ratio
of 787 appeals per 3-judge panel or a little more than three appeals “decided”
every working day. And there are numerous other demands on a circuit judge that
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changes resulting from the crisis of volume. Not only is it the case that
increased caseloads have made it more difficult for judges to monitor the
output of their colleagues and their court, it may also be that the nature of
the monitoring has changed in significant ways. In addition to being less
able to scrutinize their colleagues’ work, judges may be looking for
different things. Although the public aspects of the appellate process
typically receive the most attention as constraints on judicial behavior,
informal court norms play a substantial role as well.139 In other words,
even if judges are well-positioned to monitor one another, the monitoring
will be for violations of court norms, and sanctions will only be applied in
the case of such violations. And it may be that the norms themselves have
shifted as judges become more comfortable adjudicating large portions of
their dockets in a manner that falls short of the idealized conception.
Consider again the changes to the relationship between judges and their
decisions explored in the preceding section. Judges have unquestionably
become accustomed to delegating substantial portions of what were
historically their responsibilities to others, and, in doing so, according a
large part of the cases on their dockets a level of adjudication that falls
well short of the idealized conception. Having come to expect less of
themselves and their colleagues in these cases, there is no reason to
conclude they might not have lowered their expectations more generally.
Consideration of another change to the process of appellate adjudication
helps make the point. Courts have adopted a practice of issuing different
types of opinions. While once all appeals were resolved by way of full,
published opinions, the present practice is to resolve a substantial portion
of appeals—nearly eighty percent in the federal courts140—by way of socalled unpublished opinions. Such opinions, which have been the subject
regularly compete for time and attention. Are there three meaningful votes cast in
every federal appeal today? These ratios imply that a great deal of what today
passes for a participation on the merits by an individual circuit judge really only
amounts to rubber-stamping the work of a colleague, as opposed to the more
traditional full participation in collegial decisionmaking.
BAKER, supra note 21, at 148.
139. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 347. Because appellate courts sit in panels, any single
judge’s desire to act in a manner inconsistent with prevailing norms will require, at the very least,
the indifference of his colleagues in order to be put into effect. Because appellate courts tend to
have relatively few judges, any pattern of activity inconsistent with prevailing norms will become
known to all judges on the court. See Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 92, at 166-67. Moreover, the
courts’ small size renders informal social sanctions quite effective as constraints on behavior. Id.
at 167. But there is reason to suspect that this mechanism, too, has become less effective than it
might once have been at enforcing the adjudicative duty.
140. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, 2000 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl.S-3 (2001), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.
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of a vast amount of commentary in recent years,141 typically contain less
analysis and are often deemed to have less, if any, precedential value.142
In many cases unpublished opinions are prepared by court staff and
effectively “rubber stamped” by the judges.143 Not infrequently, the courts
dispense with opinions altogether, simply issuing an order indicating that
the lower court disposition is affirmed.144
These devices provide a ready mechanism for the avoidance of difficult
or troubling claims, as well as an increased likelihood of the inadvertent
overlooking of such claims. A judge (who is, it bears repeating, a mere
human) is simply less likely to scrutinize an opinion from the chambers of
one of her colleagues that does not constitute precedent and which as a
result will never form the basis of arguments the judge must confront in
a future case. If that opinion fails to be responsive to the parties’
arguments, the judge is less likely to notice. What I have referred to as the
increased distance between a judge and her own decisions is likely to
facilitate this dynamic. As Owen Fiss notes in addressing the
“bureaucratization” of the judiciary, judges’ increasing reliance on others
to perform portions of their tasks leads overall to a lessened sense of
responsibility for the outputs of the process.145 “The judge acts on the
assumption that his work is the product of ‘many hands,’ . . . [and that]

141. See, e.g., Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004) (commenting on the detrimental effect of unpublished opinions on
precedent and the resulting unfairness to litigants); Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The
Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004) (decrying the
destruction of precedent through unpublished opinions and addressing the power that judges—and
by extension, law clerks and staff attorneys—can wield through their use); Lauren Robel, The
Practice of Precedent: Anastasoff, Noncitation Rules, and the Meaning of Precedent in an
Interpretive Community, 35 IND. L. REV. 399 (2002) (examining appellate courts’ nonpublication
practices and non-citation rules in light of Anastasoff v. United States, an Eighth Circuit case
upholding the use of an unpublished opinion as precedent against a taxpayer); Michael B.W.
Sinclair, Anastasoff versus Hart: The Constitutionality and Wisdom of Denying Precedential
Authority to Circuit Court Decisions, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 695 (2003) (arguing that the
constitutionality and wisdom of nonpublication and non-citation rules depends on one’s conception
of stare decisis, and suggesting the existence of a middle ground).
142. See Cooper & Berman, supra note 24, at 702-03 (discussing the varying weight accorded
to unpublished opinions by the federal circuits).
143. See Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t Allow
Citation to Unpublished Dispositions, CAL. LAW., June 2000, at 44 (acknowledging that most of
the Ninth Circuit’s unpublished memorandum dispositions are drafted by law clerks or staff
attorneys and rarely edited by the judges).
144. For a history and criticism of this practice in the federal courts, see BAKER, supra note
21, at 121-25. Most state courts have an analogous procedure. See Kerri L. Klover, “Order
Opinions”—The Public’s Perception of Injustice, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1225, 1244-45 (1996).
145. See Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1456
(1983).
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[t]he decision or opinion is not wholly his own.”146
The availability of these devices also increases the possibility of more
knowing decisional failures. If one judge (or, as Judge Posner posits, even
the law clerk of one of the judges) has a strong opinion as to how a case
should be resolved, and the other judges are less interested in the case,
they are likely to acquiesce to the opinionated judge.147 Taking a stand in
opposition takes time, and may ultimately require drafting a dissenting or
concurring opinion, which consumes even more time.148 This creates a
tendency to go along, which may be even greater where the resulting
opinion creates no precedent. Indeed, Judge Richard Arnold suggests that
the prevalent use of unpublished opinions has negative effects “on the
psychology of judging”149 and creates a temptation for courts to utilize
them to “sweep[] the difficulties under the rug” in cases where applicable
legal standards appear to require an undesirable result.150 Judge Posner
invokes the same imagery, suggesting that “the unpublished opinion
provides a temptation for judges to shove difficult issues under the rug in
cases where a one-liner would be too blatant an evasion of judicial
duty.”151 Judge Patricia Wald attests that she has seen it happen.152

146. Id. (footnote omitted).
147. See POSNER, supra note 98, at 123.
148. And, as Judge Posner reminds us, judges have as much aversion to this sort of “hassle”
as anyone else. Id. at 124.
149. Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 219,
223 (1999).
150. Id. David Law concludes from a statistical analysis of asylum cases decided by the Ninth
Circuit that:
[V]oting and publication are, for some judges, strategically intertwined: for
example, judges may be prepared to acquiesce in decisions that run contrary to
their own preferences, and to vote with the majority, as long as the decision
remains unpublished, but can be driven to dissent if the majority insists upon
publication.
David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth
Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 817, 820 (2005). See generally Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and
Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297 (1999) (discussing the
normative dimensions of strategic voting).
151. POSNER, supra note 11, at 165. Posner does not view this concern as dispositive of the
question whether unpublished opinions are, on balance, useful. Id. at 168. At least one other judge
has used the rug metaphor. See Edward A. Adams, Increased Use of Unpublished Opinions
Faulted, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1994, at 1, 4 (quoting Judge Wilfred Feinberg). Other judges have
acknowledged that strategic considerations at least occasionally play a role in the decision to use
an unpublished opinion. See Deborah Jones Merritt & James J. Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What
Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 97 n.84 (2001).
152. She observes:
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3. Effects on Fulfillment of the Adjudicative Duty
The modified process typical of contemporary appellate adjudication
is certainly more conducive to breaches of the adjudicative duty than was
the traditional process. Judicial decisions are less likely nowadays to be
even weakly responsive to the parties’ proofs and arguments simply
because there are fewer points at which judges engage directly with those
proofs and arguments. In a significant portion of the cases, initial review
of the briefs is delegated to clerks or staff, oral argument is not conducted,
and opinions are drafted by clerks or staff. For most judges, important
components of what are part of the judicial role in the idealized conception
are delegated in the remainder of their case load as well. Law clerks
perform much of the initial analysis of cases through the review of briefs
and preparation of bench memoranda and typically prepare the initial
drafts of opinions. This is not to suggest that judges are not engaging in
the parties’ arguments at all. But in order for this delegation to be useful,
it must necessarily be the case that it reduces the judge’s workload, which
in turn means that it reduces both the quantity and depth of the judge’s
contact with the parties’ contentions.
Indeed, these modifications not only lessen the likelihood of
responsiveness by reducing the judge’s contact with the parties’
arguments, but also introduce occasions for the arguments to be distorted.
The judge as consumer of bench memo and editor of an opinion performs
his decisional task on what is, in an important sense, a set of secondary
documents. If the author of those documents somehow mischaracterizes
or overlooks the parties’ characterization of the dispute, the judge may not
notice simply because doing so would require a return to the briefs to
determine whether the issues as presented by the memo or opinion draft
accurately reflect the parties’ contentions. A similar dynamic holds for the
judge as monitor of his colleagues’ opinions. Reduced personal
engagement with the case at every stage will result in a judge having less
fully developed impressions and recollections of the parties’ arguments.
These more embryonic thoughts are in turn more susceptible to being
swayed away from the parties’ contentions if the opinion under review
I have seen judges purposely compromise on an unpublished decision
incorporating an agreed-upon result in order to avoid a time-consuming public
debate about what law controls. I have even seen wily would-be dissenters go
along with a result they do not like so long as it is not elevated to a precedent. We
do occasionally sweep troublesome issues under the rug, though most will not stay
put for long.
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1371, 1374 (1995).
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fails to accurately characterize them, or even omits to include some of
them. Thus, whatever the judge’s inclination to scrutinize a draft opinion
on its own terms, that scrutiny will not necessarily result in greater
compliance with the adjudicative duty if the opinion proceeds from a
misconceived or incomplete understanding of the dispute.
The conditions of modern appellate adjudication are also considerably
more likely to result in opinions that fail to achieve the candor ideal. Even
if the judge’s decisional process otherwise comports entirely with the
idealized conception, the mere fact that the opinion is written by someone
else makes it inevitable that it will at best only partially overlap with the
judge’s reasoning. This line of thought reveals another
shortcoming—namely, that in many cases under the modified process,
there is a decision, but not a decisional process of the sort contemplated by
the idealized conception. Consider a judge who merely signs off on the
recommendations of a staff lawyer regarding the disposition of a case.
That judge’s decision is likely to be the product of half-formed
impressions and assessments of the likelihood that this type of case is to
present the sort of non-routine issues as to which reliance on staff’s
recommendation would not be appropriate. Yet if an opinion is issued, it
will invariably depict a decision based on a process of traditional legal
reasoning. Not only does the opinion in this situation fail to accurately
capture the judge’s decisional process, but in an important sense there is
not actually a decisional process to be described.
Of course, this is all necessarily somewhat speculative. It seems clear
that the nature of the modern appellate process is more likely to result in
failures to satisfy the adjudicative duty. But that does not mean this
happens. The question of whether these changes in the process of appellate
adjudication have led to a corresponding increase in courts’ failures to
satisfy the adjudicative duty is an empirical one. And in an important
sense it may be unanswerable. Because so much of the process of judicial
decision-making is internal to the judge, there is ultimately no way to
determine, for example, whether the judge’s decision in a given case is
actually responsive to the parties’ proofs and arguments. Nor is it possible
to tell whether the public justifications offered for a decision in an opinion
reflect the real reasons the court decided as it did. This is, indeed, why we
rely on informal constraints rather than legal standards to generate
compliance with the adjudicative duty.153
But just as the existence and operation of the informal constraints
provides strong circumstantial evidence that decisions generated by a
process subject to those constraints will comply with the adjudicative duty,
there is also circumstantial evidence suggesting that decisions generated

153. See supra note 98.
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by today’s modified appellate process are in fact less likely to comply.
Certainly, some members of the practicing bar perceive that courts breach
the adjudicative duty with some regularity.154 In addition, not only
academics,155 but also a large number of judges,156 have suggested that the
increasing demands on judges’ time have resulted in a situation in which
many cases do not receive the attention they deserve, which implies at the
very least that courts are inadvertently breaching the adjudicative duty due
simply to a lack of resources.157 There is statistical evidence to back up this

154. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 133 n.34 (discussing the evidence of such a perception).
155. See, e.g., Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 275 (suggesting that changes to the
appellate process from increased caseloads have had an overall negative effect on the quality of
courts’ output and led to a de facto two-track system where cases that judges perceive as interesting
and important continue to receive something close to traditional appellate treatment, while other
cases, typically involving less powerful litigants, get less attention). For a somewhat more
theoretical treatment of these issues, see Fiss, supra note 145, at 1467.
156. Eighth Circuit Judge Donald Lay opined in 1981 that “courts of appeals today may
provide in many appeals only an appearance of justice rather than justice itself.” Donald P. Lay,
A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981).
Twelve years later Ninth Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt noted that “[t]hose who believe we are
doing the same quality work that we did in the past are simply fooling themselves. . . . The use
of . . . makeshift procedures ensures that many cases do not get the full attention they deserve, and
the quality of our work suffers.” Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too Many Cases: A Plea to
Save the Federal Courts, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52, 52. The following year Ninth Circuit Judge
Mary Schroeder suggested that “today’s federal appellate courts are adopting techniques that
seemed designed to prevent them from reaching the merits of cases. These formulas permit us to
do everything except decide whether the case at bar was rightly decided. This modern
jurisprudence, to put it bluntly, illustrates the maxim, ‘Don’t decide—duck.’” Mary M. Schroeder,
Appellate Justice Today: Fairness or Formulas, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 9, 27; see also Lauren K. Robel,
Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptations to Caseload, 1990 BYU L. REV. 3, 38-40 (recounting
the responses of federal appellate judges to a survey question regarding how caseload pressures
affect their ability to do their work). Judge Posner is less convinced:
Some might also find a hint of a problem of quality in the rapid fall in the reversal
rate, since the less time an appellate court spends on a case the more likely it is
simply to affirm the district court or agency, affirmance being the easy way out.
But again there are other possibilities.
POSNER, supra note 11, at 74-75.
157. Such a phenomenon would be consistent with the teachings of cognitive psychology. The
concept of “bounded rationality”—the idea that each of us possesses a limited amount of cognitive
resources, which we must ration in order to make our way through the world—suggests that:
[L]aw follows the principle of unevenness: The workmanship of rules varies in
quality, at least in part, as a function of the disparate amounts of effort that
lawmakers choose to devote to different rules. Depending upon how much
importance they place on the issue before them, lawmakers either rise—or
sink—to the occasion.
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hypothesis. The reversal rate in the federal courts of appeals has declined
from 24.5% of cases terminated on the merits in 1960158 to 9.4% in
2003.159 Some, perhaps even most, of this may be attributable to an
increase in the proportion of meritless appeals together with a progressive
narrowing of the scope of appellate review.160 But it is also consistent with
a situation in which judges who have less time to uncover error
consequently find fewer errors.161 As Judge Posner pointedly notes, “[T]he
less time an appellate court spends on a case the more likely it is simply
to affirm the district court or agency, affirmance being the easy way
out.”162
There is also evidence to support the additional assertion that court
norms have changed. Mitu Gulati and C.M.A. McCauliff studied the Third
Circuit’s use of judgment orders—dispositions accompanied by no or
nearly no elaboration—during the period from 1989 to 1996, in which the
court disposed of roughly sixty percent of its cases by way of judgment
order.163 They argue that the data are consistent with the development of
a norm pursuant to which the court disposed of some of its hardest cases
by judgment order despite the existence of internal court rules that
expressly prohibited such behavior.164 This is problematic. As Karl
Llewellyn notes, “However sound this approach to an overloaded calendar,
it does remove from the particular case one of the most compelling
pressures toward steadiness.”165 Even if, as Gulati and McCauliff were
assured, no such norm ever existed on the court, the very mechanism of
Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 599, 611 (2003) (footnote omitted).
For an application of the bounded rationality concept to explore the “affirmance effect” in appellate
courts, see Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights Into
the “Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 374-85
(2005).
158. See DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 119, at 210 tbl.B-1. Looking
back to 1945, one sees a reversal rate of 27.9%. DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, 1945
ANNUAL REPORT 70 tbl.B-1. But 1960 is generally regarded as the year in which the dramatic
changes in the business of the lower federal courts began. See Martha J. Dragich, Once A Century:
Time for a Structural Overhaul of the Federal Courts, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 11, 25 n.72.
159. See DIR. OF ADMIN. OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, supra note 119, at 27 tbl.B-5.
160. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 71-77.
161. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 98, at 1291 (“It is, of course, difficult to show that
the outcome of any appeal would be different if the judges had considered the case more carefully,
but there is circumstantial evidence suggesting that at least some results would change.”).
162. POSNER, supra note 11, at 74-75. Judge Posner is, at a minimum, skeptical of this as the
primary or even a significant explanation for the decline in reversal rates, concluding instead that
the appellate docket has evolved to include a smaller proportion of difficult cases. Id. at 75-77.
163. Gulati & McCauliff, supra note 92, at 162.
164. Id. at 158, 184.
165. LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 27. However, Llewellyn also goes on to state that “when
wisely administered, such removal can prove immaterial.” Id. This immateriality is due to the large
amount of meritless appeals the disposition of which does not require an opinion. Id.

2006]

REM ED YIN G JU D IC IAL IN AC TIVISM : O PIN IO N S AS IN FO RM ATIO N AL REG U LATIO N

779

the judgment order provides no reassurance to the contrary, since
everything is left unsaid. Somewhat less insidiously, several judges and
commentators have noted the federal appellate courts’ increasing reliance
on deferential standards of review in disposing of cases.166 Judge Mary
Schroeder describes these as “techniques of avoidance: describing factors
to be balanced, applying discretionary standards of review, examining the
trial court process rather than the substantive meaning of statutes and
rules. They avoid the difficult task of deciding whether the trial court
actually reached the right or fair result in the particular case.”167
Regardless of whether they are grounded in empirically verifiable
reality, these comments supply another reason to be concerned about the
modified appellate process. In the context of adjudicative legitimacy,
perception is, in an important sense, reality.168 The fact that appellate
courts no longer afford to each case that comes before them the same
treatment, both relative to the other cases on the docket and to the
historical norm, creates in observers the impression that courts are not
“doing their job” with respect to some portion of their caseloads.169 Even
if it were possible to demonstrate that the implementation of the
traditional, full appellate process in all of these cases would change neither
the result nor the essential components of the decisional process, the fact
that the public’s perception is otherwise counsels consideration of
mechanisms for restoring adjudicative legitimacy.
IV. JUDICIAL OPINIONS AS INFORMATIONAL REGULATION
Courts, commentators, and special commissions have devoted
countless hours to the consideration of how the appellate process or the
structure of the appellate courts might be modified to better accommodate
ever-growing caseloads.170 These efforts have resulted in various proposals
166. See POSNER, supra note 11, at 175-77.
167. Schroeder, supra note 156, at 11; see also id. at 27-28 (“We are abandoning the factual
and legal analysis, we are abandoning the individual problem, we are abandoning a process
essential if we are to reach ‘a right and fair solution.’”).
168. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189, 278-81 (2004)
(discussing the importance of the perception of legitimacy to the proper functioning of a system of
procedure).
169. See COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS,
supra note 99, at 25 (“The use of nonjudicial staff, nonargument decision-making procedures,
summary orders or unelaborated dispositions, and other procedural accommodations to caseload
volume have made the courts more efficient, but at some cost to the appearance of legitimacy of
the appellate process, and at some risk to the quality of appellate justice.”).
170. See generally COMM’N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS, supra note 99 (proposing basic and conservative changes, especially focusing on the
overburdened Ninth Circuit); BAKER, supra note 21, at 106-286 (discussing and comparing both
intramural and extramural possibilities for radical and conservative reforms); CARRINGTON, ET AL.,
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in addition to those that have already been implemented and referred to in
the preceding discussion. Examples include the creation of an additional
tier in the federal judiciary,171 the use of two-judge panels (rather than the
traditional three) for some categories of cases,172 the modification of the
federal appeals courts either by further subdividing the existing circuits or
eliminating the circuits entirely,173 and the simple addition of judges.174 In
general, the goal of these proposals has been to facilitate courts’ ability to
cope with rising caseloads through reduction of each judge’s workload.175
Such reduction would occur by making each judge responsible for fewer
cases in the aggregate, removing or deemphasizing some portion of the
decisional process from the judge’s workload (as by shifting some portion
of the circuit courts’ law creation function to another judicial level), or
some combination thereof. The apparent working assumption is that the
key to restoring adjudicative legitimacy is to provide judges with more
time to perform their responsibilities.
This Part opens the exploration of a somewhat different avenue of
reform. Rather than focusing on the reduction of judicial workload, it
considers whether there may be ways to modify the process of appellate
adjudication so as to encourage more consistent compliance with the
adjudicative duty without significantly affecting workload. Toward that
end, and as a prelude to the next Part’s proposal, this Part develops a
conception of judicial opinions as “informational regulation.” Such an
analysis not only provides a fresh perspective on the forms and functions
of judicial opinions, but also invites consideration of how the opinion
device might be modified so as to better channel the behavior that it
ostensibly merely reflects.
A. An Overview of Informational Regulation
Traditional regulation operates largely through the imposition of
regulatory prescriptions or targets relating to such things as means of
production, rates, allocation of scarce resources, and the like.176 Under
supra note 99 (suggesting structural and procedural measures to mitigate the adverse effects of
growing caseloads in the appellate courts); POSNER, supra note 11 (arguing that volume and size
reforms are not useful and discussing reforms through an economic lens and the modification of
jurisdiction requirements).
171. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 242-61.
172. Id. at 172-73.
173. Id. at 239-42, 269-76 (discussing proposals to eliminate the current circuits and replace
them with smaller courts, and to merge all of the existing circuits into a single court).
174. See Richman & Reynolds, supra note 99, at 297-334 (advocating increasing the size of
the judiciary as the “obvious solution”).
175. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 11, at 193.
176. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 161 (1982); see also ROBERT V.
PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND P OLICY 121-40 (4th ed.
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these mechanisms, the means to achieving the regulatory goal is a
requirement that the regulated entity alter its conduct so as to comply with
the prescription or target.177 Manufacturers, for example, must produce
goods having certain features, and industry must reduce its pollutant
emissions to specified levels. However, experience has revealed these
traditional “command-and-control” approaches to be frequently
cumbersome and inefficient, and consequently policymakers have
explored alternate methodologies.178
One of the more prominent alternatives is “informational regulation.”179
Under a regime of informational regulation, what is imposed on regulated
entities is not a restriction on the targeted conduct itself, but rather an
obligation to disclose certain information relating to that conduct.180 The
manufacturer does not have to change the product, but instead must tell the
world more about it. The animating principle is that the audience for the
information will, by virtue of being better informed, be better positioned
to monitor and thus act vis-à-vis the regulated entity, and thereby exert
pressure for change via market or political channels.181 Consistent with this
understanding, informational regulation is thought to be most efficient in
situations where members of the public would otherwise have difficulty
obtaining the relevant information.182
Although the mandatory disclosure mechanism is hardly new, its use
as a regulatory tool has become increasingly prevalent in recent decades
and represents, in Cass Sunstein’s estimation, “one of the most striking
developments in the last generation of American law.”183 Mandatory
disclosure requirements have accordingly been employed across such
diverse subject areas as banking, securities, food and drugs, the
environment, and automobile safety.184 Even so, only within the past
decade has there emerged much scholarly consideration of the
mechanisms of informational regulation.185 The resulting literature has
2003) (providing an overview of environmental regulatory strategies).
177. See BREYER, supra note 176, at 163.
178. See id.
179. See id. at 161.
180. See id. at 163.
181. See id. at 161.
182. See Cass R. Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949,
960-61 (1991).
183. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 613 (1999); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack
to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L.
REV. 515, 530 (2004) (“One of the most promising [recent] developments is the concept that
information may be a surprisingly effective and efficient regulatory instrument.”).
184. BREYER, supra note 176, at 161-62.
185. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 260-61 (2001);
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loosely categorized the types and aims of informational regulation, as well
as the limitations that inhere in disclosure-based mechanisms.
1. The Benefits of Informational Regulation
The most salient benefits of informational regulation accrue via its
market- and political process-enhancing effects. As this suggests, the
device is versatile. Disclosure requirements can be aimed at modifying (or
at least informing) the behavior of private actors—as is the case with
nutritional labeling on food products—or directed toward the behavior of
governmental agents—as with the requirement that agencies prepare
environmental impact statements in connection with major actions.186 As
these examples reflect, disclosure requirements can be divided between
disclosure requirements designed to facilitate the functioning of markets
and those designed to enhance the operation of political safeguards.187 The
premise underlying the former is that market participants must possess a
certain minimum amount of information in order for a market to function
properly.188 Federal securities laws provide one of the more prominent
examples of mandatory disclosure geared toward this end.189 Disclosure
designed to trigger political safeguards stems from the analogous idea that
properly functioning democracy requires that citizens possess an
appropriate baseline amount of information in order to be effective
participants in the political process.190 Both private actors and
governmental entities often lack the incentive (or face disincentives) to
disclose information necessary to a full assessment of their decisions.191
Required disclosure of such information can enable the now-informed

William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care,
99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1701 (1999); Christopher H. Schroeder, Third Way Environmentalism,
48 U. KAN. L. REV. 801, 804 (2000); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental
Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21-24 (2001); Sunstein, supra note 183, at 613; Cass R.
Sunstein, Informing America: Risk, Disclosure, and the First Amendment, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
653, 654 (1993); Sunstein, supra note 182, at 949; Vandenbergh, supra note 183, at 522-23. See
generally David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Information as Regulation,
31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10773 (2001) (providing an overview of the economic and legal literature
concerning informational regulation in the environmental context). The literature in the securities
law area has a somewhat longer history. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution
to Agency Problems, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1047, 1047 (1995) (noting the existence of “a small but
influential theoretical literature . . . on the efficiency of mandatory disclosure”).
186. See Sunstein, supra note 183, at 614.
187. Id. at 619. As Sunstein acknowledges, mandatory disclosure may often serve both ends.
Id.
188. See BREYER, supra note 176, at 161.
189. See id. at 162.
190. See Sunstein, supra note 183, at 619.
191. See Sunstein, Informing America, supra note 185, at 655-56.
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public not only to better monitor the actions of officials to ensure that
those actions are consistent with applicable standards, but also to monitor
the appropriateness and effectiveness of the standards themselves, and to
effectively debate the need for modifications.192
There are also less-apparent advantages that can result from the
imposition of a disclosure requirement. One of particular interest for
present purposes is that informational regulation can directly affect the
regulated entity’s conduct. That is, the very process of complying with a
disclosure requirement can also lead to changes in the underlying activity
independent of the effects of external monitoring. The phrase often
associated with this effect is “‘you manage what you measure.’”193 To the
extent a disclosure requirement leads the regulated entity to compile
information it had not previously gathered, the entity may make different
decisions than it otherwise would have, simply as a result of having
additional information to take into consideration in its decision-making
process.194 Thus, even in a situation where there is no prospect that
disclosure will trigger any external consequences, a disclosing entity may
have other reasons, including simple business imperatives, to modify its
behavior.195 Relatedly, the process of complying with a disclosure
requirement might lead to the internalization of the norms underlying the
regulatory regime, leading in turn to behavior that is generally more
consistent with those norms even without further regulatory activity.196
A further benefit present across all these mechanisms is that
informational regulation allows for flexibility of response. Traditional
regulation works by prescribing some aspect of the regulated entities’
conduct, which to be effective requires the regulator to anticipate all of the
situations to which the requirement might apply.197 Informational
regulation, in contrast, allows the regulated entity to determine how best
to change its practices to be more consistent with the goals of the
regulatory regime, and indeed to decide whether to adjust its conduct at
all.198
Any given regime of informational regulation can have many or even
192. See Sage, supra note 185, at 1801-25; Sunstein, supra note 183, at 625-26.
193. Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 299 (quoting Louis Lowenstein, Financial Transparency
and Corporate Governance: You Manage What You Measure, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1335, 1342
(1996)).
194. See Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 297.
195. See id. at 294-305.
196. See Stewart, supra note 185, at 127-28 (placing informational regulation within the
“reflexive law” conception of regulation).
197. See id. at 127.
198. See Mary Graham, Information as Risk Regulation: Lessons from Experience 9-10,
(Regulatory Policy Program Working Paper No. RPP-2001-04, 2001), available at
www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/RPP-2001-04.pdf.
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all of these types of effects.199 Consider two of the prominent examples of
informational regulation in the environmental context. The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)200 requires federal agencies not merely
to consider the environmental consequences of their proposed activities,
but also to issue an environmental impact statement (EIS) including a
detailed discussion of those consequences as well as alternatives.201
Significantly, that is nearly all that NEPA requires. It does not create any
requirements concerning how the agencies use the information once it has
been compiled.202 NEPA, then, can be categorized as requiring disclosure
aimed at modifying the behavior of governmental agents through the
operation of political safeguards. An EIS makes at least part of an
agency’s decision-making process transparent, and therefore subject to the
scrutiny of the public as well as other political actors. At the same time,
at least part of the motivation behind NEPA was to improve agency
decision-making independent of these political effects.203 A mere
requirement that agencies take environmental considerations into account,
the reasoning goes, would be largely meaningless standing alone. But
when combined with the processes necessary to generate an EIS—largely
the gathering and analysis of information that might otherwise have gone
unconsidered—the resulting agency decisions should be better simply
because they are better informed.204 At the same time, the process might
lead to the internalization of environmental norms, such that agency
behavior becomes generally more environmentally conscious without the
need for further regulation.205
The second prominent example of informational regulation in the
environmental area is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI).206 Under TRI,
facilities that meet certain minimum thresholds must report, in a
standardized fashion, their annual releases of more than 650 toxic

199. Id. at 7 (observing that “in practice there are probably few cases of requirements that
create incentives that are purely economic or purely political”).
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (2000).
201. See id. § 4332(C).
202. As Bradley Karkkainen puts it: “NEPA famously requires federal agencies to produce
environmental impact statements (EISs) prior to undertaking ‘major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment.’ It requires little else, and therein lies both its
singular genius and its fatal flaw.” Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring
and Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 904 (2002)
(footnote omitted).
203. See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 810-11 (2d ed. 1994).
204. See Karkkainen, supra note 202, at 909-16.
205. See id. at 910-11.
206. The TRI was created by the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
of 1986 (EPCRA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1100111050 (2000)).
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chemicals.207 The EPA, in turn, compiles this information in a publicly
accessible database.208 The TRI is largely directed toward affecting the
behavior of private actors, namely the companies that own or operate the
facilities that release toxic chemicals.209 As with NEPA, the animating
principle was to enable the public to inform itself about companies’
environmental behavior and to exert market and political pressure against
those with high emissions.210 Indeed, the TRI is considered one of the
more successful instances of informational regulation. Not only has it led
to reductions in emissions,211 it has proven to be a valuable source of
information for Congress and the EPA to use in adjusting regulatory
requirements and strategy.212 What is more, like NEPA, the TRI may have
led to behavioral changes simply as a result of making information
regarding toxic emissions both available and salient to the appropriate
decision-makers.213
2. The Costs of Informational Regulation
There are, of course, limitations and drawbacks associated with
informational regulation. First, information can be costly to gather or
distribute, and the costs may outweigh the resulting benefits.214 Second,
the information may not have its desired effect simply because of the
limitations of human cognition.215 For example, people are consistently
poor at assessing certain types of information, such as that relating to lowprobability events, with the potential result being either an under- or overreaction to disclosure.216 And too much information may lead to overload,
in which case recipients tend to ignore all the information provided.217

207. See id. § 11023.
208. See EPA.gov, Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program, http://www.epa.gov/tri/ (last
visited Mar. 27, 2006).
209. See EPA.gov, What is the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) Program?,
http://www.epa.gov/tri/whatis.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2006).
210. See PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 176, at 485.
211. See id. at 485-90; see also Schroeder, supra note 185, at 818-19 (attributing the emissions
reductions resulting from TRI “to the impact of the disclosures themselves . . . . without any direct
regulation being imposed on these various sources, they apparently have responded to citizen
reaction, or anticipated citizen reaction, to the information disclosed by the TRI.”).
212. PERCIVAL, ET AL., supra note 210, at 485-90.
213. See Karkkainen, supra note 185, at 295-305.
214. See Sunstein, supra note 183, at 626-27.
215. For a detailed discussion of the potential negative effects of informational regulation, see
Sunstein, Informing America, supra note 185, at 667-69.
216. See id. at 667.
217. See id.; see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417-20 (2003).
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Third, mandatory disclosure may skew the incentives of the discloser.218
While we may want agencies to take environmental considerations into
adequate account while making decisions, we almost certainly do not want
them to do so to the exclusion of other matters. Yet by requiring agencies
to devote resources to the preparation of EISs, we may be doing just
that.219 Alternatively, agencies forced to deal with the preparation of EISs
on a regular basis may develop “boilerplate” approaches to the process,
such that the information provided has the appearance of exhaustiveness,
but does not reflect a considered analysis.220 Relatedly, disclosure may
underinform or misinform the monitoring activity of the audience to which
it is directed. The TRI, for example, facilitates monitoring of companies
with respect to those chemicals to which its reporting requirements relate,
but in so doing it may draw the attention of the public and advocacy
groups away from companies’ handling of substances not on the required
disclosure list but which may ultimately pose a greater danger.221
3. The Importance of Design
As the preceding discussion suggests, it is critical to the effectiveness
of any scheme of informational regulation that the disclosure mechanism
be precisely tailored to the ends sought to be achieved.222 This requires in
the first instance an understanding of the nature of those ends.223 A lack of
consensus concerning the purposes of the regulatory regime can thus
thwart the development of a scheme of informational regulation, either by
preventing agreement on what should be disclosed or by inducing
compromise that results in either incomplete or inapposite disclosure
requirements. In similar fashion, an incomplete understanding of the
purposes animating a regulatory regime or of the processes being regulated
might lead to the formulation of a disclosure requirement that misdirects
the efforts of the disclosing entity and the intended audience for the
information. Both will tend to focus on the information provided, and to
exert pressure for change at the mechanisms underlying that information

218. See Sage, supra note 185, at 1781.
219. See id. at 1781-82 (arguing that “[i]ncreasing attention to the items for which disclosure
is mandated inevitably diverts resources from other uses which may be more valuable to society”)
(footnote omitted).
220. See Karkkainen, supra note 202, at 921-23 (describing the tendency for agencies to
generate such EISs). Karkkainen concludes that NEPA’s present configuration creates incentives
for agencies to attempt first to avoid the EIS requirement altogether, and, when they cannot, to
produce EISs that “tend to consist of exhaustive compilations of recycled information, sometimes
of dubious quality.” Id. at 923.
221. See Graham, supra note 198, at 19.
222. See Sage, supra note 185, at 1781.
223. See id.
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to the near-exclusion of other conduct. As a consequence, informational
regulation should ideally follow a relatively comprehensive analysis of the
processes to which the disclosure is to relate, so as to determine what the
most important components of those processes are. At a minimum, those
designing a program of informational regulation must take care to ensure
that the consequences of disclosure are not inconsistent with the goals of
regulation.224
B. Judicial Opinions as Informational Regulation
Although the idea that judicial opinions serve as an example of
informational regulation has gone unexplored, the conceptual fit between
the informational regulation template and the judicial opinion device is
strong. In a basic sense, opinions simply look like informational
regulation. The entity subject to regulation—the court—is required to
disclose certain information—the justifications for its decision, via a
written opinion—thereby facilitating the monitoring of its conduct. The
analogy works at a deeper level as well. As is the case in the paradigmatic
instance of informational regulation,225 opinions serve to provide the
public with information to which it would have virtually no access absent
a disclosure requirement. As noted above, the judicial decision-making
process is for the most part inherently private.226 Not even those with the
most information bearing on a court’s decision—the litigants
themselves—are likely to know why a court acted as it did without an
explanation. This lack of access to information is particularly acute in the
appellate setting, where oral argument represents the only other portion of
the process where the public can see the court “in action.” As we have also
seen, opinions further relate to a process as to which direct regulation is
largely ineffective.227 Courts might occasionally suggest that they are
224. This is not to suggest that informational regulation is inappropriate absent a
comprehensive understanding of the processes sought to be regulated. It may be, for example, that
an incomplete or misdirected scheme of informational regulation may lead to the development of
knowledge and experience based on which to formulate more finely-calibrated regulation in the
future.
225. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
226. See supra Part II.C.
227. This is not to suggest that there is no direct regulation of judicial decision-making. Quite
the contrary is true. Because judges are to decide cases in accordance with the law, in an important
sense all of law operates as direct regulation in this context. At least in an idealized sense, the
judicial role involves simply determining what the law is, and applying that law to the precise
situation presented. The law, however, will not always provide an answer. Whatever one’s position
on larger jurisprudential debates concerning the extent to which the law actually constrains judicial
behavior, it seems clear that the law does not provide definitive answers in a substantial portion of
cases that are litigated to the stage of requiring some sort of judicial determination. There will often
be uncertainty concerning what the applicable legal standard is, which of multiple conflicting
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under an obligation to decide in a certain way, but these suggestions
cannot meaningfully be made enforceable.228 Opinions accordingly
function as an important component of the cluster of informal constraints
that have traditionally operated to regulate judicial behavior.229
The existing literature concerning the functions of judicial opinions
identifies three primary functions of opinions: to create precedent, to
provide the parties and the public with assurance that judicial decisions are
based on appropriate grounds, and to discipline the decision-making
process. Each of these functions bears at least some of the hallmarks of
informational regulation, and the literature implicitly recognizes these
characteristics. Express consideration of opinions as informational
regulation, however, allows for a more refined sense of the capabilities of
the opinion device, particularly as it relates to opinions as a means to
shape decision-making. The remainder of this subsection develops a
conception of these functions as informational regulation, and outlines the
features of opinions necessary to best support that functioning.
1. Devices for the Creation of Precedent
Perhaps the most apparent function of appellate judicial opinions is to
memorialize decisions for use as precedent in subsequent cases.230
Opinions are virtually indispensable to a precedent-based system.231 This
is not to suggest that it would be impossible to have a system of precedent
without judicial opinions, but that it would necessarily be a very different,
less precise system.232 Observers could still track results in cases, could
draw conclusions regarding the types of facts and arguments that seem to
have mattered in those cases, and could accordingly make arguments to a
court about the appropriateness of deciding a given case in a particular
way based on how a similar case was decided in a specific way in the
past.233 But, as James Boyd White observes, these arguments would be
limited, because they could not explain:
standards ought to be given precedence, or how the standard ought to be applied to the facts of a
given case. In these cases, however broad a portion of the judiciary’s workload they may represent,
a judge cannot mechanically act in conformity with some preexisting constraint. Instead, the
judicial role, to a large extent, involves the formulation, modification, and exercise of judgment in
the application of those constraints.
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. See supra Part III.B.
230. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 120-21. See generally James Boyd White, What’s An
Opinion For?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995) (considering the relationship between opinions and
the concept of precedent).
231. See White, supra note 230, at 1363-64.
232. See id. at 1364.
233. See Eisenberg, supra note 35, at 412 (noting that “rules ordinarily cannot emerge from
an outcome unless the reasons for that outcome are given”); White, supra note 230, at 1365-66.

2006]

REM ED YIN G JU D IC IAL IN AC TIVISM : O PIN IO N S AS IN FO RM ATIO N AL REG U LATIO N

789

[W]hat each [case] meant in an accurate and authoritative
way . . . . [f]or only the judge himself can tell you what facts
counted for him, or did not count; what paradigm or template
he applied to it; or how he resolved the tension, present in
nearly every case, between the claims that can rationally be
made on one side and those that can be made on the other.”234
All that would be possible in such a regime would be rough prediction.
“But with the opinion, a wholly different dimension of legal life and
thought becomes possible—the systematic and reasoned invocation of the
past as precedent. With this practice, in turn, there can emerge an
institution that simultaneously explains and limits itself over time.”235
Even in this function one can see elements of informational regulation.
Put aside for now the fact that assuring compliance with the essential ideal
of a system of precedent—that like cases be treated alike—requires some
method of comparing past and present cases. Judicial opinions as
statements of law facilitate monitoring along another dimension—namely,
monitoring of the law itself.236 Opinions are not only the place where
courts state what the law is, but also where they must justify the law they
have articulated.237 Both in the context of the individual case and across an
entire line of cases, opinions allow for the doctrines courts create to be
analyzed and critiqued.238 Interested parties can thereby exert appropriate
pressures for change either through further resort to the judicial branch or
through the political branches.
The key aspect of opinions in performing this function is clarity of
exposition. The more clearly an opinion articulates the reasoning
underlying the court’s analysis and conclusions, the better able the
audiences for the judiciary’s doctrinal output (the legislative and executive
branches, the bar, and the public more generally) will be to assess the
soundness of that doctrine, and act in response to it. At the same time,
clarity of doctrinal expression is valuable to those who must conform their
conduct to the law. Such actors are better able to draw appropriate lines in
structuring their affairs239 and can more comfortably assume that future

234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

White, supra note 230, at 1365-66.
Id. at 1367.
See id.
See id. at 1366-67.
See id. at 1368.
As Henry Hart puts it:
[T]he test of the quality of an opinion is the light it casts, outside the four corners
of the particular lawsuit, in guiding the judgment of the hundreds of thousands of
lawyers and government officials who have to deal at first hand with the problems
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courts confronted with a similar question will interpret the doctrinal
statements of the prior court in a manner consistent with the actors’
reading.
Notably, in the performance of this function neither candor nor
responsiveness is especially important in any given case. To the extent that
their opinions function merely as statements of law, courts resemble
legislatures in that what they say generally matters considerably more than
why they said it. Future courts will be guided by prior courts’ opinions,
and thus by prior courts’ public statements regarding the nature of the
dispute before them and why it was resolved as it was. If the prior court
recharacterized the facts of the dispute, or provided reasons for its decision
that were not the true reasons, a subsequent court will not be likely to
know that and will deal with the prior opinion on its own terms. This is not
to suggest that candor and responsiveness are not important to the
functioning of opinions as repositories of doctrine. Both are generally
necessary to establish the background norms on which the system of
precedent depends.240 If courts consistently fail to provide accurate
accounts of the reasons for their decisions or to resolve the actual dispute
presented to them (as opposed to a version of the dispute with some of the
troublesome facts overlooked), then the doctrinal statements in opinions
would become meaningless as everyone realized that they were merely a
façade behind which courts exercised unbridled discretion. A departure
from candor or responsiveness in a single case, however, is unlikely to
have a significant impact on an opinion’s status as a statement of law.
2. Devices to Facilitate Monitoring of Adjudication
There is another sense in which opinions facilitate monitoring, which
represents the most apparent manifestation of opinions serving as
informational regulation. Opinions facilitate the monitoring of judicial
conduct apart from the creation of precedent in two significant respects.
First, opinions allow for the monitoring of the disposition of individual
cases.241 An opinion provides the parties to a case (and the public, more
generally) with assurance that the court’s decision was based on
appropriate factors and reached pursuant to the appropriate processes.242
of everyday life and of the thousands of judges who have to handle the great mass
of the litigation which ultimately develops.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1958 Term: Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84, 96 (1959).
240. See id. at 737.
241. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 119-20; Wald, supra note 152, at 1372.
242. This was Fuller’s argument in favor of generally requiring opinions. See supra note 34
and accompanying text.
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As Judge Wald puts it, opinions serve “to reinforce [courts’] oftchallenged and arguably shaky authority to tell others—including our
duly-elected political leaders—what to do.”243 If a court’s explanation for
its decision fails to satisfy one of the many metrics by which judicial
decisions are to be assessed, such as rationality, compliance with law or
responsiveness to the parties’ arguments, the parties or the public can
respond. Such a response might involve public critique of the court and the
opinion or resort to a higher court or legislature.244 There is another
component to this dynamic. As we have seen, internal monitoring has
historically constituted a substantial constraint on appellate adjudication.245
If the judge responsible for drafting an opinion failed to account for some
aspect of the case, his colleagues could be relied on to call the matter to his
attention following their review of the opinion. This latter form of
monitoring in the individual case receives less attention in the literature,
but may ultimately be more significant as a means of regulating judicial
conduct.
The second respect in which opinions facilitate monitoring is more
general. Opinions enable the assessment of courts’ performance over a
long period of time and a large number of cases. Over such expanses it
becomes possible to determine the extent to which courts are in fact
treating like cases alike, or whether instead certain categories of cases or
types of litigants receive differential treatment.246 Opinions further
facilitate monitoring for candor by allowing for evaluation of the
relationship between the results in individual cases and a court’s stated
reasons for its resolution of those cases. Put another way, opinions enable
observers to check the pattern of results in individual cases when viewed
over time against both the specifics of the legal doctrine ostensibly being
applied and the underlying goals of that doctrine. Only such a distant
perspective can reveal whether, for example, a doctrine that purports to
give criminal defendants a procedural advantage ever actually results in
defendant victories. If it doesn’t, the problem might lie with the doctrine,
which might be unworkable for some reason. Or the problem might lie
with the courts, whose failure to be candid about their reasons for deciding
the cases in question could perhaps only be revealed through an analysis
of the results of a series of cases over time. In either case, the existence of
the disconnect between the apparent dictates of doctrine and the results in

243. Wald, supra note 152, at 1372.
244. See Shapiro, supra note 68, at 737.
245. See supra Part III.B.
246. See Wald, supra note 152, at 1372, 1376 (suggesting that opinions “demonstrate our
recognition that under a government of laws, ordinary people have a right to expect that the law
will apply to all citizens alike” and asserting that opinions are necessary for the existence of
“reasonably consistent justice administered by hundreds of judges for millions of people”).
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actual cases can be brought to the attention of the courts or political bodies
in an effort to better align the two.
As this discussion suggests, candor is critical for opinions to effectively
fulfill their mission as devices to enable monitoring of judicial conduct.
Only when a court discloses the true reasons for its decision is it possible
for a reader to determine whether the court acted appropriately and,
consequently, to react to the court’s decision in an appropriate manner.
And to the extent that one accepts the prescriptions of the adjudicative
duty outlined in Part I, this in turn requires that opinions should reflect an
analysis that is appropriately responsive to the parties’ contentions.
3. Devices to Affect Performance of the Judicial Function
Judges frequently observe that the mere fact of having to write an
opinion affects the process of deciding a case.247 Certainly the use of
writing, as opposed to purely oral methods of disposing of cases, allows
for a controlled process in which complicated problems are more easily
resolved.248 What is more, those who have experienced the process of
organizing one’s thoughts and putting them down on paper know that it
inevitably leads to refinement of rationale, often leads to substantial
changes in rationale, and occasionally leads to entirely different
conclusions.249 To the extent, then, that rationality is an important source
of adjudicative legitimacy, and that the more heavily deliberated decisions
with written opinions are consequently more rational, opinions are
desirable—and perhaps even indispensable250—components of the
adjudicative process.
The literature on the functions of judicial opinions generally does not
advance beyond the basic observation that the act of writing requires more
(and more disciplined) thought, which might in turn engender different
247. See, e.g., COFFIN, supra note 115, at 57-58 (discussing the ways in which the act of
writing constrains the act of deciding); Wald, supra note 152, at 1374-75 (noting that the process
of justifying a decision often leads to a change of rationale or even result, and contrasting this with
the process of “writing to explain a pre-ordained result”).
248. See Suzanne Ehrenberg, Embracing the Writing-Centered Legal Process, 89 IOWA L.
REV. 1159, 1186 (2004) (“When a lawyer is required to commit a legal argument, or a judge is
required to commit a judicial opinion to writing, she becomes capable of a level of both creative
and critical thinking that is not possible when legal analysis is expressed only in an oral form.”).
249. See BAKER, supra note 21, at 120 (“A decisionmaker who must reason through to a
conclusion in print has reasoned in fact.”); CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 99, at 31 (noting that
“[c]onclusions easily reached without setting down the reasons sometimes undergo revision when
the decider sets out to justify the decision.”); McGowan, supra note 79, at 513 (“[T]he premise that
judicial writing can be divorced from deciding or other aspects of judging is wrong. How the
judicial opinion is written affects how cases are decided: Writing affects how judges judge.”).
250. See McGowan, supra note 79, at 513-14 (arguing for the indispensability of written
opinions authored by judges themselves).
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thought.251 This overlooks what is apparent from consideration of judicial
opinions in light of the literature on informational regulation, namely that
there are more subtle ways in which the opinion form directs the process
of judging. Consider, for example, a judge who follows an opinion format
that invariably includes a paragraph addressing the nature and source of
the court’s jurisdiction.252 Such a judge, in a classic example of
management of what is measured, would be considerably less likely to
miss a problem with the court’s jurisdiction than a judge who does not
make it a practice to address jurisdiction.
It is this last observation that is most valuable in terms of using
opinions as a device to remedy judicial inactivism. Perhaps the opinion
form can be harnessed to change the manner in which judges go about
deciding cases and, to the extent the processes are distinguishable, the
process of justifying their decisions. If opinion design can be modified so
as to encourage greater candor and responsiveness, decisions would tend
toward greater compliance with the adjudicative duty as a result of the
changes. And since increased candor eases the burdens involved in
monitoring adjudicative behavior, further compliance would follow.
A candor requirement is, however, more easily articulated than
implemented. Those who have considered the topic of candor in detail
have uniformly come to the conclusion that, whatever its desirability as a
matter of theory, full candor is unattainable in practice.253 Judges
themselves are unlikely to fully understand, much less be able to describe,
their decisional process in any given case.254 Perhaps the best we can hope
for, then, is a set of proxies for full candor. Although we cannot know
precisely how the judge made her way from a set of inputs (facts,
precedent, arguments, and the like) to a conclusion, by making that
information readily available and encouraging, if not requiring, an opinion
that sets forth a reasoning process tying those inputs together as it
proceeds to a conclusion, we could promote greater responsiveness and,
at the very least, make it more difficult for a judge to avoid providing a
candid justification for a decision. The next Part explores the possibility
of such a mechanism.

251. But see id. at 513 (“The opinion form also affects what questions judges believe they may
decide and how they may decide them.”).
252. See, e.g., Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429, 434 (3d Cir. 2005) (Roth, J.);
Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (Roth, J.); United States v. Neadle, 72 F.3d
1104, 1108 (3d Cir. 1995) (Roth, J.); United States v. Pollen, 978 F.2d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 1992)
(Roth, J.).
253. See Oldfather, supra note 5, at 155-60.
254. See Dan Simon, The Double-Consciousness of Judging: The Problematic Legacy of
Cardozo, 79 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1044-45 (2000) (discussing, through an analysis of Cardozo’s work,
the difficulty judges have in understanding their decisional process).
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V. FRAMING ARGUMENTS—USING THE OPINION FORM TO RESTORE
ADJUDICATIVE LEGITIMACY
Although the informational-regulatory features of judicial opinions are
apparent, it is likewise clear that opinions in their present form serve as
somewhat blunt instruments in terms of facilitating the monitoring and
directing of judicial behavior.255 In part this is simply a function of
information overload on a broad scale. Given the sheer volume of opinions
issued by courts, both external and internal monitoring has become more
difficult simply because of the magnitude of the resources necessary to do
so effectively.256 Externally, while the parties remain relatively wellpositioned to assess, based on an opinion, whether the court in their case
resolved it in an appropriate way, the public generally has long been
unable to engage in effective monitoring via review of opinions.257 Under
the idealized conception of appellate adjudication, judges have ample time
to study an opinion drafted by one of their colleagues, and to do so in light
of the parties’ contentions as developed in the briefs and at oral argument.
Now, however, the time for leisurely review and reflection has vanished.
And, as we have seen, procedural changes implemented to conserve
judicial time have worked to decrease the depth of judges’ contact with
most cases.258 Not only does today’s judge have less time to monitor, she
also has a less-developed understanding on which to base her monitoring.
If one of her colleagues nods, she is less likely to notice. The same is true
if the colleague intentionally departs from the appropriate manner of
resolution. When the departure involves inactivist conduct—which
generally involves a failure to act rather than misguided action—she will
be especially disadvantaged in her ability to detect a violation.
The opinion form also contributes to its shortcomings as an instrument
of informational regulation by failing to channel judicial behavior toward
compliance with the adjudicative duty. At present, although there is
certainly a rough uniformity among judicial opinions from judge to judge
and from court to court,259 courts do not closely prescribe format.260 As a

255. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 98, at 27 (“[T]he very fact that the opinion has varied
functions makes it possible to play up one to the neglect of another.”).
256. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
257. Interestingly, early proposals for limited publication of opinions came from the bar,
which found that an increasingly large number of opinions made it difficult to keep pace with
courts’ output. See, e.g., John J. O’Connell, A Dissertation on Judicial Opinions, 23 TEMP. L.Q.
13, 14 (1949) (referencing such a proposal).
258. See supra Part III.C.1.
259. See ALDISERT, supra note 79, at 607 (suggesting that the necessary components of an
opinion are a “narration of adjudicative facts, . . . the statement of the issue or issues framing the
case for decision,” and the justification for the court’s decision).
260. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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consequence, opinion authors enjoy considerable freedom to manipulate
their portrayal of the facts of the case, the parties’ arguments, and so
forth.261 Nothing ensures that an opinion issued by one judge would greatly
resemble an opinion in the same case were it to be issued by a different
judge.
The amorphousness of the opinion form renders it deficient as an
informational-regulatory device in two ways. First, it hampers the
monitoring function. Because the reader of an opinion can have no fixed
expectation regarding what should appear in it, he cannot know simply
from the opinion when something that should be there is not there. In this
way the lack of a prescribed format abets inactivism. It also thwarts
monitoring by preventing effective comparison of cases against one
another. If a judge writing an opinion in Case B has (and uses) the freedom
to portray it as being more similar to Case A than it really is, then it
becomes considerably more difficult to determine whether, for example,
like cases are really being treated alike. Confronted with the opinion in
Case B, an observer has no way of knowing that Case B was actually not
like Case A, and therefore perhaps should not have been resolved in the
same way. Second, it results in opinions falling short of their potential to
channel the conduct of judges. For example, absent a meaningful
requirement that all the parties’ contentions be at least mentioned in an
opinion, a court is less likely to keep track of all those contentions and
therefore to address them. A court is also better able to intentionally avoid
addressing every argument, because aside from the parties (one of whom
will be happy with the court’s disposition and thus not care), no one is
likely to discover such avoidance. Put in the lingo of informational
regulation, because such considerations are not measured, they are not
managed.
Conceiving of opinions as a form of informational regulation both
invites and facilitates consideration of how the opinion device might be
modified to direct judicial behavior. Taking Part I’s definition of the
adjudicative duty as its regulatory goal, this Part proposes a simple
modification to the opinion format, framing arguments, the use of which
would bring about direct gains in the responsiveness of judicial decisionmaking and (though to a lesser extent) in the candor with which decisions
are justified, and would likewise enhance the ability to monitor
adjudication both internally and externally. Moreover, these effects,
together with less apparent potential benefits to the quality of advocacy
and parties’ sense of participation in the process, would accrue without
unduly constraining judges in the exercise of their function.
261. See Wald, supra note 152, at 1386, 1389-90 (observing that the author of an appellate
opinion has considerable room in which to manipulate the factual story in a case and that judges
do occasionally engage in such manipulation).
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A. Framing Arguments as a Means to Combat Judicial Inactivism
The framing argument concept is a simple one. The primary
component would be brief, party-generated statements of the issues before
the court that would be included as a part of any opinion issued by the
court. In effect, each party would have the opportunity to place its
assessment of what is at stake in a case alongside the court’s. Aside from
the presence of these statements in opinions, nothing would change, at
least in terms of what judges would be required to include in their
opinions. Instead, the mere presence of this additional information would
both facilitate the monitoring of judicial behavior and shape that behavior
more directly.
1. Effects on the Decision-Making Process
Judges forced to write opinions preceded by framing arguments are
more likely to reach decisions in a manner that is at least weakly
responsive to the parties’ arguments. This follows from the notion that
what is measured will be managed.262 As judges’ increasing workloads
have limited their ability to become deeply engaged with most of the cases
that come before them, they are inevitably less able to keep track of, and
therefore be responsive to, the parties’ claims. This is particularly so given
that judges today are more often the editors of the opinions issued under
their name rather than the authors.263 When the initial draft of an opinion
is prepared by a law clerk, who as a recent law school graduate is
markedly less law-conditioned264 than a judge, the opinion may be less
responsive than would be the case were the judge the author. Even if one
assumes that a clerk would generally tend to write an opinion that is
appropriately responsive, the writing of such an opinion does nothing to
ensure that the underlying decision was responsive. And to the extent the
judge relies on a clerk’s characterization of the dispute when editing an
opinion rather than returning to the briefs, the judge’s edits may
themselves make the opinion less responsive.
Yet framing arguments retain the flexibility that is one of the primary
benefits of informational regulation. The presence of the parties’
contentions as part of the opinion increases the likelihood that the court
will be mindful of them in deciding the case, and will at least speak to
them in its opinion. The court will thus satisfy its obligation to be weakly
responsive, while not being compelled to engage in either strong
responsiveness or any particular depth of treatment. If a party’s
262. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 117, 131 and accompanying text.
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contentions are facially without merit, the court can dispose of them
quickly. If the court concludes the parties have misconceived the nature of
their dispute, it can briefly state why that is so before proceeding to
analyze the case in the terms the court deems appropriate.
The use of framing arguments would likewise encourage candor,
primarily by making it more difficult for a court to recharacterize the
dispute before it so as to avoid what it considers troublesome aspects of
that dispute. For example, a court faced with a claim governed by a line of
precedent that seems to compel a result the court finds distasteful might
normally choose to recast or gloss over the difficult aspects of the case
before it. The presence of framing arguments would make it more difficult
to do so, however, and would force the court instead to be more
forthcoming about the reasons behind its resolution. This effect on candor
would of course be limited. Merely having to confront the parties’
characterization of the dispute does not ensure that a court’s stated reasons
for resolving the dispute are its actual reasons for doing so. Still, in the
aggregate, framing arguments seem likely to result in more candid
opinions.
Framing arguments’ effects on the process of adjudicating individual
cases might in turn result in more generalized benefits. The literature on
informational regulation recognizes norm internalization as one of the
legitimate goals of a disclosure-based regime.265 The underlying idea here
is that an entity required to disclose certain information will become more
sensitized to the concerns animating the disclosure requirement, and will
adjust its conduct accordingly.266 Thus, even if framing arguments are not
implemented in every case—for example in those cases disposed of
without any opinion at all—they may nonetheless affect judicial behavior
in those cases by rehabituating judges to the process of responsive
decision-making.
2. Effects on Monitoring
The second category of benefits that would flow from the use of
framing arguments relates to the ability to monitor. The primary source of
this benefit would stem from framing arguments’ tendency to substantially
reduce the effort involved in monitoring a court’s performance. The
presence of framing arguments would allow a reader to more readily
determine whether the court ignored an issue in its entirety, whether it
squarely confronted the core of a party’s argument, and whether it
adequately dealt with the legal authorities on which the party based its
arguments. In short, a reader would have a ready gauge for assessing the
265. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
266. Id.
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extent to which an opinion is responsive to the parties’ arguments. This
would facilitate both external and internal monitoring. Not only would the
public be better positioned to determine whether a court has truly engaged
with the parties’ claims, but so would other members of the court.
The salience of the information presented by framing arguments is key
to these benefits. It has, of course, always been possible for an interested
party to obtain copies of the briefs filed in a case and to compare the
arguments made in those briefs with the court’s characterization of the
parties’ arguments and its handling of the claims asserted. But, apart from
scholarly interest, there was little point in doing so, and the effort required
undoubtedly tended to discourage those whose curiosity might otherwise
have led them to undertake this sort of investigation. Even for the judge
reviewing a colleague’s draft opinion there is some effort involved in
pulling the briefs out of the file and reviewing their characterizations of
what is at stake. And while that small step might not have traditionally
proved to be much of an impediment, contemporary circumstances are
different. Today’s busy judge may feel it unnecessary to take that extra
step, particularly where she has already signed off on the ultimate
disposition of the case and where the precise manner in which that
disposition is put into effect may be deemed legally irrelevant to all future
cases.267 One might also suggest that the increasing computerization of
legal research will also reduce the effort necessary to uncover the precise
nature of the claims asserted. Westlaw, for example, provides a link to the
parties’ briefs in its display of recently issued opinions. Accessing that
information, however, is not cost-free. Nor does it possess the immediacy
of a statement incorporated into the opinion. In short, if framing arguments
are included in an opinion, the reader need look no further for the
information. The parties’ arguments will accompany the court’s statement
of its reasoning wherever the reader should happen to take the opinion.
This increases the likelihood that readers will give it attention, and
consequently the likelihood that readers will act in response to what they
perceive as inactivist conduct.
3. Additional Benefits
In addition to their tendency to enhance the legitimacy of adjudication,
the use of framing arguments might produce related benefits.
a. Improved Advocacy
One additional, potential benefit from the use of framing arguments is
the effect on the quality of advocacy.268 Judges, with good reason,
267. This would be the case with an unpublished disposition in many courts.
268. Thanks to my colleague, Dennis Arrow, for initially spotting this.
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complain about the quality of briefs submitted by counsel every bit as
often as lawyers complain about judicial opinions.269 Were lawyers
required to formulate issue statements subject to the possibility that their
words would appear in the official reporters alongside the court’s opinion,
most would undoubtedly spend more time in the effort to craft a statement
that would not make them look foolish. This effect could be enhanced by
placing a strict limit on the number of words that could be used to describe
each issue.270 Legal writing guru Bryan Garner insists that “if you can’t
phrase your issue in 75 words, you probably don’t know what the issue
is.”271 It may take some additional time and effort to reach an effective
formulation within that limit, but both the parties’ argument and the
court’s decisional process are likely to benefit as a result.
b. Enhanced Participation
A less tangible benefit likely to arise from the use of framing
arguments is that their inclusion in opinions would enhance the parties’
sense of participation. This benefit is distinct from the instrumental
benefits of enhanced participation identified above. In other words, apart
from its tendency to produce results that are more appropriate in an
objective sense, participation in the process promotes acceptance of the
results of that process by both the individuals affected and society more
generally.272 As with the instrumental benefits, here too increasing the
saliency of participation is likely to facilitate such acceptance. Simply
being able to see her arguments featured prominently atop a court’s
decision is likely to help a litigant believe that those arguments were taken
into appropriate account in the decision-making process.

269. See, e.g., ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON APPELLATE PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 368 (1987) (“One of the most common complaints of appellate judges and their law
clerks is the inadequacy of most briefs filed in appellate courts.”); THOMAS B. MARVELL,
APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS 28-37 (1978) (giving an account of the mutual disdain with
which appellate judges and lawyers tend to view one another’s work product).
270. The overall number of issues could safely remain unlimited, since it would be subject to
the practical caps imposed by page- or word-limits imposed on briefs.
271. BRYAN A. GARNER, THE WINNING BRIEF: 100 TIPS FOR PERSUASIVE BRIEFING IN TRIAL
AND APPELLATE COURTS 80 (2d ed. 2003).
272. See Stephan Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift
and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 487, 526
(1980) (discussing participation’s tendency “to promote litigant and societal acceptance of the
decisions rendered by the courts”); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation, 78 IOWA L. REV.
981, 995-1002 (1993) (discussing the instrumental and dignitary values of participation); Robert
S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for “Process Values,” 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1974) (discussing the value of participation as “an approximation to
autonomous self-determination of varying degrees of directness”).
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B. Implementation
The precise format of framing arguments could vary widely. In terms
of deployment in opinions, the arguments could be placed at the top of an
opinion, in the body, or even in an opening footnote. Turning to content,
the parties might be restricted to merely including information that is
already present in their briefs (most likely their respective statements of
the issues), or they might be required to generate a wholly distinct
statement of what they believe to be the most significant aspects of the
case. Word and issue limits could easily be applied. Some jurisdictions
might broaden the device to allow or require the parties to include a
statement of the cases, statutes, or other authorities that are most central
to their arguments. The means of implementation might likewise vary.
While the use of framing arguments might be required by court rule or by
statute, individual judges (who, as we have seen, are relatively unrestricted
in how they write opinions) could simply choose to start including them
in their opinions. Indeed, a version of the mechanism could be employed
with no court involvement at all if a legal publisher were to choose to
include the parties’ issue statements in its reports of opinions.273 It might
also include each party’s list of the cases, statutes, or other authorities that
are most central to its arguments. What is significant is not so much the
precise format as the notion that the parties have an opportunity to frame
the issues before the court in a way that becomes part of the court’s
opinion.
As changes go, this would hardly be disruptive. Courts in most
jurisdictions already require parties to include issue statements in their
briefs, and may require statements of apposite authority.274 While the
creation of framing arguments might require a slightly different emphasis,
it would not introduce a new element into the process, nor even require
more from counsel than they should already be doing. There is, indeed,
some historical precedent for the use of framing arguments. In the earliest
American law reporters, summaries of the facts and arguments of counsel
prepared by the reporter customarily accompanied judicial opinions.275

273. Thanks to my colleague Scott Moss for this observation. Framing arguments implemented
in this way would likely be somewhat less beneficial than framing arguments included as part of
an opinion generated by a court. While their effect on external monitoring would remain the same,
the absence of the arguments during the drafting and circulation stage would leave the difficulties
of internal monitoring unchanged. At the same time, the direct effects on judicial behavior would
likely be reduced, as the lack of a constant reminder of the need for responsiveness would lead to
reduced measurement of responsiveness, and as a result less management of it.
274. See STERN, supra note 94, at 263 (noting that statements of the issues or questions
presented are required in most jurisdictions, while statements of apposite authority are less
uniformly required).
275. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW PUBLISHING 43-44 (1990).
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Framing arguments are somewhat different in format, because they would
be prepared by the parties and likely subject to length limitations, but
similar in function to these summaries.
VI. CONCLUSION
When judging in accordance with the idealized conception of appellate
adjudication represented an achievable ideal, it was perhaps unnecessary
to be concerned with judicial inactivism for the simple reason that
institutional design generated results largely in accord with the
adjudicative duty. Those days are past.276 It is not possible to establish
conclusively that changes in the manner in which appellate courts operate
have rendered them unable to satisfy the adjudicative duty in a substantial
portion of their cases. But it is clear that the changed conditions of
adjudication have resulted in an environment substantially more conducive
to inactivism. What is more, in the case of adjudicative legitimacy,
perception is, in large part, reality.277 For some time now, the perception
from both within the judiciary and among the bar is that appellate courts
are failing to deliver what we expect from them.
This Article has attempted to further define the appropriate content of
our expectations for the judiciary and to provide a mechanism by which
they might be better satisfied. Framing arguments are not a panacea. Their
implementation would, however, increase the barriers to breaches of the
adjudicative duty. And by proposing them I hope, if nothing else, to spur
further consideration of procedural changes that can enhance the
functioning of courts without relying on decreases in workload to do so.

Surrency notes that his examination of the prefaces to the reports lead to the conclusion “that the
reporters considered the preparation of the summaries of the arguments of counsel to be their most
arduous task.” Id. at 43. Surrency notes the demise of these summaries, but does not offer a cause
for their discontinuation.
276. Cf. POSNER, supra note 11, at 176-77 (explaining courts’ increasing reliance on standards
of review as a reaction to caseload pressures and the increased size of the federal judiciary, both
of which have made informal monitoring less reliable and, accordingly, rules-based monitoring
more desirable).
277. See generally Note, Satisfying the “Appearance of Justice”: The Uses of Apparent
Impropriety in Constitutional Adjudication, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2708 (2004) (considering the
relationship between apparent and actual impropriety).

